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1. Introduction 
 
 Attaining financial self sufficiency has never been an important agenda for the 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) for the states in India.  It has, in fact, performed more 
as an instrument of expenditure decentralization instead of functioning as a driver of 
financial decentralization.  Quite evidently, without financial self-sufficiency any local 
government would soon tend to run out of steam and eventually comply with a limited 
understanding of treating Gram Panchayats (henceforth, GPs) as mere implementing 
agencies.  This in turn is expected to limit the scope of several programs as discussed by 
Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay (1993).  However, it seems that the fiscal limitation is not the 
only factor which restrains GPs from undertaking desired operations.  The legal and 
institutional frameworks within which the GPs function are of paramount importance and 
demand explicit considerations if one attempts to review the aspect of financial self-
sufficiency among the GPs1.  
Presently, we look into the aspect of financial self-sufficiency among the PRIs in 
West Bengal, an eastern state in India.  The paper draws extensively from secondary data 
available with the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of 
West Bengal (WBP&RD) along with a primary survey conducted in twelve GPs from 
different parts of the state.  There are many unexplored areas of taxation which are 
mentioned in the West Bengal Gram Panchayat Act, 1973 under section 47.  These 
include vehicle registration fees, trade registration fees, fees for drainage clearance, 
market fees, advertisement fees, crematorium maintenance fees, pump set registration 
fees, etc.  The rates naturally vary by the type of public good, such as drinking water, 
street lights, waste clearance, toll taxes on village roads, etc.  It is, however, not 
automatic. It should be clearly mentioned that the application of various user fees and 
charges require framing and adoption of bye-laws by GPs of the respective State so that 
                                                 
1
 The self government status to the PRIs in West Bengal has given rise to two types of debates: one, from the 
viewpoint of „feasibility frontier‟ and the other, concerning the concept of self governance. The advocates of 
the „feasibility frontier‟ argued that West Bengal, having to operate under Indian union has to tackle several 
limiting factors – constitutional and structural  which limit the state government in furthering the process of 
decentralization to the PRIs. Therefore, the performance of PRIs should be judged in the light of such 
constraints rather than any ideal conceptualization of self governance as M. K. Gandhi and the 73rd & 74th 
amendment to the Constitution, 1993 had envisaged. For details see Lieten (1994), Mishra (2002) and Basu 
(1997). Also see Datta (2007).   
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the statutory power is vested in them.  This seems an important but relatively unexplored 
subject in the political economy of public goods provision at the state level. In our pursuit 
of understanding the political and economic correlation between GPs adopting bye-laws, 
we have chosen two political parameters and two economic parameters.  Percentage of 
GP seats in a district captured and percentage of GPs ruled by different political parties 
are considered to be two political parameters.  On the other hand, per capita income of 
districts2 in 2001-02 (at 1993-94 constant prices) developed by Ghosh & Chatterjee 
(2004) and the per capita own sources of revenue (OSR) of PRIs belonging to different 
districts of the state during the financial year 2002-03 and 2003-04 are considered as the 
two economic parameters.  While we offer detailed analysis later, presently, it may be 
mentioned that there seems to be no correlation between economic and political status of 
the GPS and the acceptance of draft bye-laws in the districts where Left Front (LF) led by 
the Communist Part of India (Marxist) [CPI (M)] candidates had captured higher number 
of GP seats.  This is also true for majority GPs that were ruled by the LF in 2005.  A 
positive correlation would imply that as the control of power by specific political parties 
increases, adoption of bye-laws increases as well.  No correlation suggests that the 
control of power by political parties have no impact on adoption of bye-laws.  Once 
adopted, the bye-laws cannot be discarded but may remain unused or underutilized.        
 At the same time, we do not observe positive correlation in districts where the 
non-LF comprising mainly of Indian National Congress (INC), Bhartia Janata Party 
(BJP) and Trinamool Congress (TMC) are majority according to our parameters. 
Likewise, so far as the correlation between economic parameters and draft bye-laws is 
concerned, there is no systematic correspondence (Table 6.1, Appendix 6.1). 
Based on the information available from WBP&RD, large number of GPs started 
collecting user charges making use of the statutory powers vested in them through 
finalization of respective bye-laws. As a consequence, these GPs have managed to 
increase their own sources of revenue (OSR) from Rs. 21 crores (INR 0.21 bn.) during 
the financial year of 2002-03 to Rs. 41 crores (INR 0.41 bn.) during 2004-05.  
Considering the diversity in revenue raising potential among GPs, it is interesting to 
assess how efficiently the GPs have managed to prepare their own bye-laws largely in 
conformity with the standardized version of bye-laws (issued 14th October 2003, 
WBP&RD), and ignoring those sections which are not applicable to respective localities.  
To this end, we considered 5 to 6 GPs, covering 4 to 5% of the total electorate of each GP 
including the elected GP members.  Nonetheless, whatever the state of the bye-laws, 
neither the villagers nor the decision-makers themselves seemed to be aware of these – it 
could partly be ignorance and partly avoiding of the unpopular subject of taxation.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the subject of 
administrative procedures and bye-laws and section 3 deals with quality of services and 
taxation.  Section 4 offers a view on existing problems and the future burdens and section 
5 concludes.       
                                                 
2WBP&RD/SRD (2004) observed that GPs belonging to higher per capita income regions are those which 
also generate higher own sources of revenue. However, non-tax revenue does not depend on the per capita 
income; rather it depends on variables like possession of revenue yielding assets or providing public goods 
and services from which user charges can be collected. A World Bank (2004) study on Kerala and 
Karnataka also observed that usually the per capita own sources of revenue are significantly higher in GPs 
where the level of economic activity is stronger. 
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2.   Administrative procedures and bye-laws 
 
West Bengal First State Finance Commissions (WBFSFC) started with the 
impression that local governments suffer from built-in-inefficiency in becoming self-
reliant.  This is mainly owing to their proximity to the people on the one hand, and that 
the most buoyant taxes are already skimmed off by either the State or the Centre leaving 
the PRIs with only the inelastic sources of revenue, on the other.  To add to their woes, 
the recommendations of two WBSFCs (first in 1995 and the second in 2002) offered 
limited directives related to mere redeployment of funds.  Not only did they fail to 
suggest any new area of potential taxation to be exploited by the PRIs, but there was 
neither a clear guidance regarding underutilization of existing tax base at the GP level3.  
Instead, both of them mainly depended on transfer of funds from the State government to 
the PRIs in the form of untied funds.  It accounted for 16% of total proceeds of the State 
taxes in a year as a statutory entitlement ensuring not only predictable and regular flow of 
resources to the PRIs but also allowing PRIs to frame their own plans for catering to 
localized requirements effectively.  Even then, the Second WBSFC had noticed that the 
state had not followed the recommendations of the first commission on entitlement of 
funds to the PRIs.  Their view was also supported by West Bengal Human Development 
Report (2004: 59).  Untied grants only started flowing to the PRIs from 1999-00 and that 
too was significantly lower than the stipulated 16 per cent, mainly owing to acute 
financial crisis of the State.  In admission of the financial crisis, the WBSSFC (2002) 
intended to fix the entitlement funds at 10 per cent instead of 16 per cent.  And as far as 
the qualitative side of the entitlement fund was concerned, the WBSSFC (2002) observed 
that the grants so far provided to the Zilla Parishad (ZP) were essentially tied with 
schemes decided by the higher departments denying the true spirit of untied funds.  
Two major constraints seem to be operating on PRI finance of the State.  First, 
persistently low mobilization of own resources and second, the presence of gross 
structural as well as functional inefficiencies in revenue mobilization.  Almost one and 
half decades ago Mukarji & Bandyopadhyay Committee (1993) felt that in West Bengal, 
approximately all PRIs raise only about 1% of their total expenditure. Considering the 
different tiers of the PRIs separately, Jena (1999) found that the percentage of own 
resource mobilization of GPs in this State constitutes on an average 7% of its total 
receipts.  Respective figures for other two tiers i.e. Panchayat Samitis (PSs) and Zilla 
Parishads (ZP) are even less than 1% and declining over time.  As per the recent figures 
provided by WBP&RD per capita own revenue collection of PRIs i.e., all tiers taken 
together is as low as Rs. 8.40 for the year 2003-04 (WBP&RD, 2003-04: 20).  
In this connection, however, the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 described 
many areas of tapping local resources.  The former Minister of Panchayats of West 
Bengal, Dr. Surya Kanta Mishra along with WBSFCs (1995 & 2002) admitted that 
whatever taxation power is vested with Panchayats had not been optimally used (Mishra, 
                                                 
3Underutilization resulted mostly out of a host of factors including faulty accounting system, gross irregularities in 
administering and collecting land & building tax (LBT), etc. – the only predictable and regular own sources of tax 
revenue at GP level, absence of a neutral assessment mechanism and large number of defaulters particularly, the 
rural rich. 
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2002: 65).  Studies by Mitra (1996) and Pal and Adak (2003) suggest underutilization of 
tax powers of the GPs.  Of these, Pal & Adak (2003) described gross underassessment in 
collection of Land and Building Tax (LBT, the only predictable and regular own source 
of tax revenue) by GPs for the period between 1996-97 and 2000-01.   The yearly 
average underassessment is found to be to the tune of 84% i.e., only 26% of the total tax 
assessment from LBT is actually collected.  A more recent study undertaken by the 
WBP&RD/ Strengthening Rural Development (SRD, 2004) indicated that average tax 
collection of GPs is only 19% (total tax collection as percentage of the total assessment 
when it only refers to current assessment and excluding arrears) for the year of 2002-03.  
Thus, from the tax collection alone GPs could have generated at least five times more 
than the total reported collections.  
                Until 2003, most of these sources of revenue have not been properly exploited 
(WBSFC, 1995: 19; WBSSFC, 2002) and there has been hardly any systematic effort on 
the part of the government to provide guidelines to the GPs at large for framing of bye-
laws and fixing of maximum rates (Jena, 1999).  Notably, a few GPs had nonetheless 
been collecting some of these charges for many decades.4  It was the West Bengal 
Panchayat Act (Amendment), 2003 which made framing of bye-laws obligatory for all 
GPs and was followed up by the circular dated 14th October 2003 issued by WBP&RD 
providing standardized norms for framing bye-laws.  However, revenue mobilized 
through the levy of user charges and fees could be considered “not so much as 
mechanisms to boost overall local revenues, but to earmark revenues to ensure that a 
sufficient level of resources is available to finance at least the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) costs of infrastructure projects and preferably the cost also” (Parker, 1995: 7). 
Thus, while it is normally expected that the Union and State governments have the 
responsibility of releasing funds for making substantial creation of the capital assets of 
the services to be provided at GP level, it seems that the local community must bear the 
O&M costs of these community services.  
As per the latest information provided by the WBP&RD until June 2005, 2924 
GPs among 3354 (out of 2924, 577 GPs had made draft bye-laws and remaining 2347 
finalized their bye-laws) i.e., 87% of the total GPs have taken initiatives for preparing 
such bye-laws5. One, however, is left to wonder why there seemed to have been no 
opposition against such additional taxation in the phase of implementation when it was 
strongly protested against at the discussion phase itself by the opposition Trinamool 
Congress (TMC).  In the period between the later part of 2003 and first few months of 
2004 its leader Ms. Mamata Banerjee, and currently the Chief Minister of West Bengal, 
had been opposing the idea on the plea that the provision would put further burden on the 
village people.  
Since there was long delays and inaction since the Act was passed in 1973, we 
enquired if the sudden initiative taken by GPs, after the age old inertia of low level of 
own resources, is a true attempt of breaking the status-quo or was that an administrative 
                                                 
4WBP&RD/SRD (2004) study also noticed that barring few GPs in WB, until 2003, there was no initiative from the 
GPs to collect revenue from these sources. Of the 12 sample GPs, only three GPs have been taking few rates and 
fees in their respective GPs. Rates for providing street lights was there since 1978 in Belda-2. In Bogula-2 this rate 
was operational since 2000-01. In Ranisarai toll tax on motorized vehicles (4 to 8 wheelers) has been in place since 
1995 in three main connecting roads.  
5As per the latest information provided by the WBP&RD, out of total 3354 GPs in WB, 3225 have finalized bye-
laws and 104 have made draft bye-laws until 31st October 2006. 
  
118 
compulsion that led 87% of the total GPs of the State in preparing bye-laws. This 
suspicion seems to be justified by our initial observation of acute ignorance of villagers 
and GP members regarding bye-laws passed in their respective GPs.  It eventually raised 
some important questions pertaining to the quality issue of such resource mobilization 
drives.  It remains to be seen as to whether democratic norms were followed while 
finalizing bye-laws and whether further taxation in the form of user charges was at all 
accepted by common villagers as well as GP members in the aftermath of bye-laws being 
enacted.  These, combined with other pertinent matters like whether efficiency in tax 
collecting machinery was improved upon and adequate administrative measures taken up 
by the GPs as important pre-requisites for adopting bye-laws need to be found out.  It 
also needs scrutiny if in finalizing the bye-laws a sufficiently innovative approach was 
adopted in place of traditional mechanical approach while incorporating certain sections 
of user charges.  Economic and political categorization of 12 GPs under the present 
survey was made in order to capture significant variations, if any, between GPs belonging 
to different economic conditions and political affiliations and fulfilling requirements of 
bye-laws.  
 
The Procedure 
As per the protocol, passing of the bye-laws suitable for a particular GP require 
certain procedures to be followed.  It should be discussed among elected representatives 
of GPs at the board meeting and with villagers at GSN and/or GS with a view to 
preparing draft bye-laws. In order to bring that matter more meaningfully to the electors, 
draft bye-laws should also be displayed for 45 days and announcements to be made about 
that in proper time so that reservations/additions/alterations about any section(s) of the 
bye-laws might be accommodated within the stipulated 45 days. It is then that the draft 
bye-laws can be taken up for reconsideration and eventual finalization. It is after 
following this protocol that the GP will be able to declare the date of implementation of 
bye-laws designed for imposing user charges. 
 
Methodology 
We interviewed 100 to 115 villagers i.e., on an average 0.8% of the total 
electorates of each GP covering almost every constituency. Occupation-wise distribution 
of the interviewees under the study is the following: proprietorship/business (17%), 
cultivation (8.5%), landless labor (20%), retail shop-owner (11%), casual labor (14.6%), 
teacher (2.6%), housewife (8.5%), rural informal workers (5%), service (2.4%), 
unemployed (5.8%) and others (4.5%) (Table 6.33, Appendix 6.2).  In addition, we also 
prepared structured questionnaire for elected GP members, tax collectors and for 
Executive Assistant/GP Secretary- the top officials at the GP level.  Information gathered 
from filled in questionnaires supplemented the unstructured interviews and group 
meetings held with large number of village people.  
12 GPs (Table 6.3, Appendix 6.1) which finalized bye-laws were chosen for our 
field survey and further categorized into two broader groups – economic and political.  
For the economic categorization 12 GPs were grouped under three categories: high, 
medium and low income potential measured in terms of percentage of OSR to total 
revenue of the GP during 2004-05 (actual) and 2005-06 (estimated).  So far as the 
political category is concerned, 12 GPs were grouped under four categories: (i) absolute 
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majority enjoyed by the LF; (ii) absolute majority enjoyed by the non-LF; (iii) LF 
dominated GPs with significant presence of the non-LF and finally, (iv) non-LF 
dominated GPs with significant presence of the LF members (Table 6.2, Appendix 6.1). 
  
Results 
Of the total elected representatives of the 12 GPs surveyed, 73% said that the 
decision to introduce bye-laws for imposing user charges was approved through board 
meetings.  Some GP members, however, made a distinction between “discussion at the 
board meeting” from “only read the matter” or “being conveyed the message” and we 
categorized them “partly yes” and it accounts for 1.6 % of all responses.  However, for 
assessing the quality of knowledge of GP members as distinct from customary 
understanding of bye-laws, we used two parameters. One, awareness pertaining to the 
passing of draft or final bye-laws in their respective GP.  And two, adequate knowledge 
of different user charges as incorporated in the passed bye-laws to be implemented or 
already in practice in the concerned GP. The former accounts for 56% and later 11% of 
responses made by the GP members interviewed. More importantly, it is observed that 
most of 11%, i.e., those who are aware about different sections of user charges 
incorporated in the finalized version of bye-laws, are either Pradhan or Up-pradhan.  This 
indicates that except for the leaders of the GPs, only few GP members are actually aware 
of the present status of bye-laws (column 14 & 15 of Table 6.4, Appendix 6.1).  
Display of notices as regards draft bye-laws at important public places and 
making proper announcements seem quite unimportant. Respondents who are aware of 
these notice is 32.5% of the total interviewed.  Quite understandably, villagers are not 
expected to read notices written either in English or Bengali put up in public places and 
may not grasp the complexities of different sections of bye-laws designed for imposing 
user charges in the form of different fees, tolls etc., with varying rates and structures from 
a single announcement. The usual and more effective democratic procedure of making 
villagers aware of the bye-laws should have been exchange of views/opinions at GSN 
and/or GS meetings. Unfortunately, only 38% of the total elected GP members of 12 GPs 
interviewed felt the necessity of exploiting this means to communicate such matters to 
villagers.  Here again some GP members have made a distinction between “discussions 
taking place at GSN and/or GS” from “only read the matter” or “being conveyed the 
message to them”. We categorized these as “partly yes” and the group stands at 3.7% 
(Table 6.4, Appendix 6.1).  
As it should be clear from the above discussion, by and large, participatory 
democracy (i.e., both inter and intra-institutional democracy) was subdued in finalizing 
and adopting bye-laws.  It remains to be seen as to what extent political affiliation plays 
role in this respect.  A broad categorization of LF and non-LF dominated GPs reveals that 
in the non-LF dominated sample as much as 87% of the GP members had discussed such 
things at board meeting while the corresponding percentage in the LF dominated GPs is 
about 56%. 48% of the total GP members in the non-LF dominated sample had 
discussions regarding bye-laws in GSN and GS vis-à-vis 26% in the LF dominated GPs.  
About 37% GP members seem to be aware of notices and announcements made about 
bye-laws in the non-LF led GPs while the respective figure for the LF-led GPs is about 
29%.  It is also worth noting that members in the non-LF dominated GPs (73%), 
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regardless of political affiliation seem to be much more aware of bye-laws than those in 
the LF dominated GPs (35%) (Table 6.4, Appendix 6.1).  
Table 6.5 in Appendix 6.1 throws some light on the extent to which intra-institution 
democracy (inclusion of GP members, in particular opposition members in decision 
making) was ensured in pursuing finalization of bye-laws in the sample GPs.  As noted 
earlier, here also non-LF-led GPs seem to have better performance in ensuring greater 
number of participation from opposition members than those led by the LF.  In fact, 96% 
of total LF GP members belonging to the non-LF led GPs have participated in the 
discussion held at board meetings.  Compared to that, only 72% of the total non-LF GP 
members took part in the decision making process (finalization of bye-laws) in the GPs 
led by the LF.  As for the number of opposition members taking initiatives to discuss the 
issue at GSN and/or GS we find that 35% of the total LF GP members belonging to the 
non-LF-led GPs had brought this issue to GSN and/or GS whereas only 11% of non-LF 
members belonging to the LF-led GPs did the same.  However, there may be a self-
selection problem with such participation which our limited data cannot capture.  
Nonetheless, none of the opposition non-LF GP members elected from the LF-led GPs 
were found to be aware of bye-laws notices or any announcements while at least 9% of 
the total LF GP members belonging to the non-LF led GPs were aware of such things.  
Finally, preparation of final or draft bye-laws in the GPs 65% of LF GP members elected 
from the non-LF-led GPs and 6% of the non-LF GP members elected from the LF-led 
GPs were aware.  
It appears that finalizing of bye-laws in GPs led by the LF and GPs led by non-LF 
parties did not uphold the democratic norms particularly well.  In this regard, GPs led by 
the LF performed much worse than the complementary group.  Even among the LF 
dominated GPs considered in the present study, those with significant presence of 
opposition e.g., Belda-2, Murardi and Mamudpur have performed relatively better in 
terms of following the democratic norms than in the absolutely LF dominated GPs. Non-
LF alliances seemed to have remained candid and open in expressing their opposition.  In 
addition, unlike LF-led GPs, non-LF GPs are not likely to have any dilemma in 
encouraging open discussion as regards the bye-laws in the board meeting comprising 
both non-LF and opposition LF members for fear of opposition as the directives then 
came from the LF-led State government.  Ironically, however, GPs led by the LF 
members seem to have been suffering from a different kind of problem.  There are 
reasons to believe that most of LF GP members, like the non-LF GP members do not in 
principle accept imposition of user charges but can not vent open opposition to the 
circular issued by their own government. It is due to this dilemma that they tend to take a 
non-transparent position on the question, keeping other GP members in the dark, 
regardless of whether they belonged to the LF or non-LF.  Note that, our survey does not 
bring out the subtleties of decision making and the above should be treated as conjectures 
on rational behavior.    
On the other hand, 67.6 in Appendix 6.1 shows that none of villagers interviewed 
in the 12 GPs had any information whatsoever about the user charges to be imposed at 
rates described in the finalized /draft version of bye-laws of the respective GP.  Nor did 
they have any information about the present status of the bye-laws i.e., the date of 
implementation, the period during which notice was put up or announcement made, etc. 
In fact, out of the total number of villagers interviewed 63% did not have any idea about 
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bye-laws. And of the remaining 37 % who seemed to have some idea of what bye-laws 
are all about were able get to the point only after referring to the protest staged by the 
Trinamool Congress focusing on a few crucial elements6 of bye-laws. Such issues 
campaigned by the opposition party about two years ago, were, however, subsequently 
discarded by the WBP&RD as irrelevant.  Furthermore the section with some ideas about 
bye-laws can be further sub-divided into two groups, viz., those who can remember 
having heard about it from newspapers and public media (11%) and those who have 
come to be informed from fellow villagers and political parties/activists living in their 
neighborhood (26%).  Quite evidently, people living in villages have less access to print 
and electronic media such that interactions with each other and exchange of information 
in public places plays greater role in spreading information. No pattern, however, 
emerges in relation to such ignorance in the GPs dominated by LF and those by non-LF 
parties. One possible explanation of large information gaps might be that it was just read 
out at GSN and/or GS instead of being discussed (also see Oommen and Ghosh, 2005)7 
given low participation and comprehensibility of the audience.  Further, Sengupta & 
Ghosh (2004) felt that villagers are not in fact unaware of the platform in GPs but simply 
think of it as a waste of time causing low attendance at GSN and/or GS (CAREER, 2003: 
60). There is not only an widespread apathy among villagers to attend the platform but 
also very few households are actually aware that there are two GS meetings (GSN & GS) 
per year being held in their respective GPs.   
As evident from Table 6.13 in Appendix 6.2, villagers have offered four types of 
reasons for avoiding such platform: opinions of common villagers are not important 
(36%), attending GSN and GS is not important to them (23%), decision of GS and GSN 
are usually taken elsewhere and conveyed to villagers (17%), and that various 
development programmes are undertaken without due regard to the majority opinion 
expressed at GSN and GS (16%).  The magnitude of the problem of participatory 
democracy is also measurable from the fact that more than half of the GP members (54%) 
interviewed feel that platforms such as GSN and GS are non-attractive to the villagers 
(Table 6.18, Appendix 6.2). 
This generalized apathy made it possible for the GP members to manage the 
whole thing by just conveying the message without confrontations.  That apart, highest 
leadership of GPs (Pradhan and Up-Pradhan along with administrative heads viz., the 
Executive Assistant and GP Secretary) did not pursue innovative ideas and seek opinions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6Catchy phrase like „domestic pets - cows and goats are going to be taxed‟ was the weapon used by the 
opposition during their protests against bye-laws. Short summary of standard circular on bye-laws 
described in the Appendix 7.2 shows that fees on pets only refers to precious dogs, birds and horses, and 
not cows and goats. Interestingly, most GPs surveyed here rejected this fee while preparing bye-laws with 
the exception of Narayanpur and Budhakhali, both of which were led by the TMC & INC alliance using 
purely mechanical adoption rules.   
7Respondents belonging to Below Poverty Line (BPL) and non-BPL categories taken together suggest that they do 
not attend GSN and GS because: they do not find it useful (6.6%), only few people speak while others do not get a 
chance (10.2%), people are never informed properly about the meeting (38%), people can not afford to lose a day‟s 
wage to attend the meeting (41.6%), meetings are not held at the convenient place (2.2%), due to pressure of work 
(0.7%) and due to illness (0.7%) (Oommen & Ghosh, 2005: 188-189). 
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3. Taxation and quality of local services 
 
One of the most important pre-requisites of imposing user charges appears to be 
enhancement of services on which charges are to be imposed.  By and large, GPs under 
the present survey revealed that the condition of the services (like all weather roads, 
drinking water, drainage service, decomposition of waste, provision of agricultural 
market and street lights) is extremely poor.  Studies undertaken by WBP&RD/SRD 
(2004) and Oommen and Ghosh (2005: 179) observed that on average no GP of the state 
provides basic amenities in a regular manner „causing health hazards, public 
inconvenience, and discomfort‟.  They found that items in which the involvement of 
Panchayat is practically non-existent are street lights, crematorium, improvement of the 
local markets, irrigation facilities, garbage clearance from public places, garbage disposal 
from private households, cleaning drains and finally garbage treatment. 
The absence of local level planning based on a broader perspective of identifying 
priority areas and channeling funds accordingly, myopic views of meeting electoral needs 
of GP members for securing their support base took primacy.8 Thus, when asked whether 
development funds are distributed on the basis of priority or is it distributed among the 
members in order to reduce quarrels and squabbles for funds within a manageable limit, 
as much as 48% of the GP members interviewed suggested that the process of 
distribution disregarded priority areas chosen by participatory planning.  Although, 71% 
of the total GP members interviewed denied role of power or influence in distribution of 
development funds but they also agreed that the opposition (both LF and non-LF) was 
barely incorporated in the functioning at GP level (Table 6.19, Appendix 6.2).  
On average 82% of villagers consented on further taxation on condition that the 
services are enhanced.  Such acceptance level ranges between 97% in Ranisarai to 66% 
in Budhakhali in our study.  Therefore, if effective link is established between provision 
of services and imposition of user charges, majority of villagers would be encouraged to 
pay taxes.  It is, however, clear that GPs like Shibdaspur (90%), Ranisarai (97%), 
Murardi (96%) and Narayanpur (84%) which severely lack even basic services are more 
ready to pay extra taxes if enhancement is ensured.  Those enjoying relatively better 
conditions such as, Srirampur (70%), Bogula-2 (71%), and Kamarpukur (75%) (Table 
6.7, Appendix 6.1) do not subscribe to such ideas, not surprisingly.   
From a different angle, 78 out of 188 GP members interviewed i.e., 42% of total 
had discussed about bye-laws or at least passed it to the GSN and/or GS and the 
remaining 58% had not done so either to avoid such contentious issues from being 
discussed at GSN/ GS for fear of strong opposition (see column 7 & 8 of Table 6.4, 
Appendix 6.1). Further, out of 78 GP members who had discussed this issue at GSN/GS, 
68 i.e., 87% observed that most villagers opposed the idea of introducing bye-laws 
designed for imposing user charges and only remaining 6 out of 78 i.e., 8% maintained 
that despite initial opposition, villagers were ultimately persuaded by them. The 
remaining 5% i.e., 4 out of 78 GP members interviewed found villagers not against 
                                                 
8One member of Duilla GP suggested that the allocation mechanism is uncertain and very imperfect. It has 
been suggested time and again that funds must ne distributed on the basis of priorities.  However, such 
suggestion readily lends itself to subject evaluation and political influences and therefore seems unstable.  
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further taxation per se when they were asked to opine on the subject (columns 3 to 5 of 
Table 6.8, Appendix 6.1). 
 During our discussion with the GP members about bye-laws, almost all of them 
(98% in 12 GPs areas, column 7 of Table 6.7, Appendix 6.1, Kamarpukur and Bogula-2 
are relatively richer localities) opined that no further taxation depicted in the bye-laws 
can be implemented in the given conditions. Thus, the very basic premise for passing and 
implementing bye-laws for imposing user charges remains unfulfilled as common 
villagers combine with elected representatives to rule out any possibility of further 
taxation.  Apart from the basic structural problems such as poor economic conditions and 
lack of adequate service provision, other constraints for further taxation are also 
identified by the GP members. These include fear of losing political support (29%), lack 
of trust by villagers on forums like GPs (19%), fear od misuse of revenues (39%) on the 
one hand and the fact that GPs fail to be an efficient and neutral administrative body in 
performing their duties on the other.   
 
 
General perceptions on misuse of development fund  
 
As to whether development funds received by the GPs from the government and 
the tax revenue in particular goes unreported, 61% of GP members interviewed opined in 
the negative and argued that people receive a receipt of tax clearance each time they pay 
taxes. That apart, budget prepared by the GPs are submitted twice a year before the GSN 
and once a year before the GS where it is clearly stated how the development fund along 
with proceeds from taxes have been or shall be utilized.  All these leave little room for 
mis-utilization. They also observed that people would hardly bother about such a small 
amount of money that is paid to the GP in the form of tax. Those who do believe that the 
fund is grossly misused emphasized on the fact that acute corruption at GP level has 
created such perception among common villagers (17%). Those who are not so certain 
about the matter maintained that opposition forces to make such accusations but probably 
common villagers do not think in this manner (21%) (Table 6.9, Appendix 6.1).  
However, let us compare the opinion expressed by the GP members concerning misuse of 
development funds in general and tax revenue proceeds in particular with the common 
villagers‟ understanding of the monetary management in their GP area. Awareness on 
this question relates both to democratic functioning of GPs particularly in the era of right 
to information and the level of trust on GPs as a transparent administrative body.  Only 
8% of total villagers interviewed think that proceeds from taxes as well as development 
fund received from governments is being used properly.  About 35% of the villagers 
maintain a rather ambivalent stance while about 33% maintain that there is a case of 
gross misuse.  A sizeable section (24%) does not have any idea whatsoever about the 
issue at stake (Table 6.14, Appendix 6.2). Pal & Adak (2003) earlier observed that only 
22% of total villagers interviewed believed that the tax income is spent for development 
purposes and another study regarding proper use of the Panchayat funds for projects 
reveals that only 5% of total villagers interviewed felt that there had not been any misuse 
(CAREER, 2003: 60).  A large number of villagers in both of these micro studies based 
on several GPs in West Bengal expressed their ignorance about the expenditure pattern of 
the funds received by the GPs.   A recent study on rural decentralization (CSSSC, 2006) 
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covering 162 GPs of the State found that only 14% of the total villagers interviewed think 
that GP funds were utilized properly and when asked whether GP members could be 
trusted in financial matters only 25% of the total respondents answered in the affirmative.  
 
 
4. Existing Problems and Further Burdens 
 
In order to maintain the existing revenue base properly and implement further 
taxation in the form of user charges following finalization of bye-laws, GPs need to attain 
a certain level of administrative efficiency.  Whether the existing revenue mobilization 
machineries at GP level are efficient enough to administer tax and non-tax base is a cause 
for concern.  However, before discussing the issue of inefficiency in revenue 
mobilization machineries at GP level it should be kept in mind that the lack of political 
will of the state government to treat PRIs as financially self sufficient institutions 
dissuades GPs from exploiting own sources of revenue under their jurisdiction, to its full 
potential.  Keeping this basic structural constraint in mind, efficiency of tax collecting 
machineries could be discussed from two different angles, namely, structural and 
functional.  Structural inefficiency refers to lack of efficient, objective and systematized 
institutional structure in the form of a separate tax cell/department within each GP.  It is 
coupled with the absence of a neutral body of an assessor entrusted with relevant 
valuations – a prior to imposition of user charges. The combined effects of all these lead 
to the following functional inefficiencies, for example, the growing gap between total 
assessment and total tax collected, growing number of rich defaulters, problem of under 
assessment of properties, lack of symmetry in valuating old and new buildings of similar 
status, absence of systematic efforts in updating properties from time to time, etc.   
 
Constraints in raising revenue  
 
Top officials of GPs i.e., Executive Assistants (EA) and/or GP Secretary (total 12) of GPs 
under the present survey have provided similar observations regarding the inadequacy of 
functionaries at the GP level9 that are already overburdened with several other 
responsibilities and receive a fairly low honorarium. All these, as felt by the respondents, 
need immediate attention and enhancement in order to improve the motivation of tax 
collectors (TCs) and the GP members (Table 6.11, Appendix 6.1). 
Tax collectors interviewed (total 18) identified a few constraints in the machinery 
such as lack of political will and initiative of the GP members themselves in collecting 
and administering taxes (15); lack of political will in dealing with defaulters in general 
and rich and influential defaulters including supporters of political parties, in particular 
(16); unavailability of any scheme to make the old defaulters accountable and absence of 
any legal action against defaulters (old and new) (13); lack of transparency in 
administering taxes by GP members while absolute reluctance of GP members in 
                                                 
9Acute staff shortage under the jurisdiction of GPs becomes more evident from Table 7.15 Appendix 7.1 
that except Ranisarai GP and Kamarpukur GP, none of the sample GP is equipped with stipulated number 
of functionaries at the GP level.  CSSSC (2006) study found that the GPs are unable to send regular 
monthly report on undergoing schemes. The usual explanation for the delay is lack of adequate staff in 
these GPs.    
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discussing contentious issues (13); and lastly, valuation of properties being often done at 
the discretion of GP members without following standard norms subjected to strong 
political influence (15)10  
(column 3 to 7 of Table 6.12a, Appendix 6.1).  
 
Regressive tax collection – views of tax collectors 
 The information shared by 18 TCs out of 11 GPs11 combined with unstructured 
interviews with GP members, villagers and administrative officials indicate that there is 
not only structural and functional lacunae in the existing revenue mobilizing machineries 
but also a regressive tendency in the tax collection pattern (Box 6.2.1 Appendix 6.2). 
Based on the approximate calculations offered by the TCs it seems that (column 4, Table 
6.12b, Appendix 6.1) that percentage of under-valuation of properties with a view to 
impose LBT in general is in the range of 85% in Ranisari to 20% in Kamarpukur. When 
asked whether the problem of under-valuation of properties is more in case of rich than 
that of poor, out of 18 TCs interviewed, 16 answered in the affirmative while only one 
respondent did not think so and one other did not think that it was regressive (Bogula-2). 
Under-valuation of assets for imposing LBT has also been found in the study of Pal & 
Adak (2003) where richer people used to pay only 7% of the actual due according to their 
own estimates.  
 When enquired about the problem of default in tax payments, all the TCs from 11 
GPs admitted that it is one of the greatest problems in generating own resources. Albeit 
the quantitative assessment (percentage of total defaulters to total tax payers) varied from 
one GP to another, yet according to their own estimates the default percentage ranged 
from 20% to 70%.  Moreover, in majority of TCs opinion, the number of defaulters is 
more among the rich than the poor.  Apparently, the percentage of rich defaulters is in the 
range of 70% to 90%, while it is 10% to 30% for the poor.  More generally, TCs seem to 
come to a consensus on the issue of regressive tax collection machinery and that it is well 
known among all stakeholders.  
It should be noted at this point that the GP members are most likely to come from 
middle and upper middle class families in the neighborhood and this could be a 
significant explanatory factor behind such regressive tax collection pattern.  Table 6.17, 
Appendix 6.2 indicates that out of the total 207 GP members spread in 12 GPs surveyed, 
only 5 are direct tillers or casual labor while 6 are unemployed.  GPs belonging to the LF 
and non-LF do not seem to differ in this respect.  The study conducted by SIPRD (2002) 
on different districts of West Bengal (soon after the PRIs election was held in 1998) 
revealed poor representation of marginal sections of villagers in the GPs. Distribution of 
GP members by occupation as found in the CSSSC (2006) study also corroborates that a 
fairly low share (12% of all GP members surveyed) of representation come from 
                                                 
10The detailed statutory procedures and required time-frame regarding final assessment of land and building 
required for imposing LBT to be conducted by the GP administration following nine stages is depicted in 
the updated version of The West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 2004. Those 
who are constructing new buildings do not want to pay LBT due to abnormally high LBT compared to old 
buildings of the same type. Concerned GP members are not taking adequate measures in bringing down the 
lack of parity in assessing new and old buildings and hence losing significant amount of resources to be 
collected from LBT. 
11In Murardi, no tax collector is appointed. In Murardi, LBT is not imposed and Trade Registration Fee 
(TRF) is irregularly imposed.  
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agricultural labor (8.4%), artisans (0.9%), fishermen (0.5%), weavers (0.6%) and share-
croppers (1.3%). Predominance of such occupations in the rural communities is quite 
well known.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  
 The Panchayat movement in West Bengal started with the notion that the rural 
mass should not be viewed as a passive agent of development but as active participants in 
the process. The PRIs were meant to undermine to some extent the pre-existing 
bureaucracy – thanks to the slogan of “destroy the centres of vested interests” (Datta, 
1998: 126). Unfortunately, as it stands, the PRI itself has become an instrument for 
consolidating power of political parties by exerting complete control over it. Such 
politicization of PRIs does not lead to political awareness among villagers and is the main 
reason for the lack of enthusiasm among villagers as well as GP members in exploiting 
even the mere formal framework of participatory democracy. All these have resulted in 
resurgence of bureaucracy that was intended to be curbed.  
 In fact, it seems that the GPs have started losing the initial focus on the model of 
people‟s government, and over time they have been restricted to the role of an agency.  
Even measured by the parameters of bureaucratic functioning the PRIs do not perform 
satisfactorily.  Intolerance and frequent exclusion of the opposition in the process of 
decision making have already become inalienable part of its functioning leading to 
alleged corruption and nepotism.  Furthermore, absence of adequate financial self 
sufficiency, which is one of the most basic requirements of self governance, made it 
difficult for the PRIs to efficiently discharge the dual responsibility of administration and 
development.  
 In the absence of participatory planning at GP level, fragmented, myopic and vote 
bank driven programs of development takes the upper hand.  It has largely replaced the 
integrated approach of priority based, long term and sustainable development.  In 
addition, dependence on schematic funds for local development as against un-tied grants 
designed for giving some independence to GPs lead not only to gross under-utilization of 
development funds but also non-convergence of different development schemes.  All 
these result in the lack of durability of assets created and inadequate service provisions at 
local levels, which in turn severely limits the reliability of the GPs as providers of 
necessary amenities and information. 
 Attaining financial self sufficiency has never been an important agenda for the 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) of the State since inception and the pattern that 
dominates could be appropriately coined as „expenditure decentralization‟ and not the 
decentralization of financial power.  Recent activism in relation to the finalization of bye-
laws for imposing different fees, rates and tolls on services provided to the villagers 
essentially for enhancing own resource mobilization by majority of GPs has however, 
come to the fore.  The problem nevertheless lies with the true underlying agenda for such 
enthusiasm.  Is it a holistic attempt at enhancing own resources or is it the routine 
administrative compulsion? If it is the second one, then one should not expect much out 
of such developments.  However, the State government also declared punitive measures 
against non-performing GPs.  As we have experienced in our field survey, most GPs have 
been at fault on all four counts, namely, ensuring participatory democracy in pursuing 
bye-laws; attaching adequate importance to the level of acceptance of villagers as well as 
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elected representatives of GPs; undertaking adequate administrative measures which 
would be necessary for implementing further taxation and developing innovative 
approached instead of mechanical replication of standard directives provided by the 
WBP&RD, to accommodate local realities and opinions expressed by GP members.  
 However, gross violation of democratic norms by way of excluding the tax payers 
from the process of preparing bye-laws has been observed in all GPs regardless of 
political affiliation. While the quantitative attendance was somehow ensured in the GS 
and GSN meetings, considered as the most visible forum of accountability, very low level 
of quality participation left the villagers in absolute darkness regarding bye-laws even at 
the time of acceptance. So far as exercising internal democracy is concerned, non-LF GPs 
seem better performers than the LF-led GPs.  Ever since the issue of imposition of user-
charges came to the forefront, the opposition in the State had opposed it vehemently and 
maintained their position in GPs where they are not in power.  At the same time they 
were under administrative compulsion of implementing it both for proving themselves to 
be responsible administrators and for avoiding punitive measures.  GPs led by the non-LF 
did not seem to have much hesitation in incorporating the LF GP members because the 
very proposition came from the LF-led State government.  On the other hand, GPs led by 
the LF, in order to avoid uncomfortable questions not only by the opposition but also by 
their own members (most expressed their opposition against bye-laws individually during 
interviews), chose not to invite open discussion about bye-laws.  The discussion and 
adoption both remained significantly non-transparent in the process. 
 Of the two main constraints of additional taxation, namely poor economic 
condition of villagers and inadequate provision of necessary services, the latter seems to 
be binding. Majority of villagers along with representatives at the GP level seem to agree 
about further taxation if and only if provisions of necessary services were enhanced.  
There are other important constraints as well, such as, fear of losing political support, 
lack of credibility of the system of GP, proximity to common villagers affecting taxation 
and expenditure plans. Of these, the neighborhood issue is important in view of losing 
political support.   
 That the GPs under the present survey remained captive of traditional-mechanical 
approach and driven merely by administrative compulsion in finalizing bye-laws is also 
revealed from the following trends.  Several GPs apparently replicated sections of user 
charges directly from the government circular without considering the local issues. The 
GPs have rarely cared to incorporate opinions expressed by the GP members regarding 
possible amendments/alterations in the structure and rates of user charges framed in the 
standard circular.  Worse still, only in four GPs (Bogula-2, Narayanpur, Mamudpur and 
Ranisarai) out of 12, the finalized version of bye-laws contain minimum necessary 
information such as date of finalization of bye-laws and the date of implementation of the 
same.   
 However, after much hype of activism on finalization of bye-laws, no significant 
enhancement of revenue base is observed in the post–bye-laws period as compared to the 
previous period.  Although all GPs under the present survey did incorporate almost all the 
user charges provided in the standard circular given by the WBP&RD, in reality they 
seem to have maintained status quo by limiting themselves to the old revenue base. The 
study also revealed that not only the new areas of user charges and fees incorporated in 
the bye-laws were left out but in practice, some fees and rates (such as vehicle 
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registration fee and trade registration fee) which were there since many decades but not 
adequately utilized, also became quite unimportant.   
Needless to say, finalization of bye-laws has brought the opportunity for the GPs, 
particularly those urbanized in nature and those having some centers of business and 
commercial activities to raise resources through trade registration fees. Along with this, 
fees on displaying advertisements, fees on cleaning drains, collecting waste and fees on 
providing street lights could be potential sources of revenue for these GPs.  These 
measures would not only help to enhance own resource generation but also improve basic 
civic amenities at the GP level.  After all, if the direct and indirect taxes in the country or 
the state and the general public finance are either insufficient or inefficiently utilized for 
provision of basic services in the rural areas, supply of basic amenities may have to 
depend largely on alternative sources of funding.  Adoption and implementation of taxes 
in appropriate legal regimes could be one such option.  Finally, it should be 
acknowledged that we have bypassed serious questions on distributive politics at national 
and sub-national levels, which should be treated as an important element in such 
discussions.  The associated questions on regional and intra-regional growth and 
inequality are similarly issues that this limited survey cannot address, but should be 
considered in future attempts.   
 
Box 6. 1 
 
Structural and functional lacuna coupled with perceived regressive tendencies in tax collecting 
machineries in GPs as perceived by the tax collectors (TCs) of the sample GPs 
1. Lack of initiative and political will in administering and generating own source of tax revenues 
of GPs  
 
2. Perceived regressive tendencies in administering and collecting LBT at GPs level 
With a view to make LBT payment regular, submission of LBT clearance receipt was made compulsory by almost 
every GP in the State before  issuing necessary certificates 
Rich people are by and large reluctant in paying LBT and hence such measure failed to motivate rich 
tax payers because; 
 They can pay the total due amount of the tax when it is needed 
 They have better influence on GP people and can manage to receive necessary papers without showing 
the counterpart of the tax clearance 
 They can bribe GP members in order to avoid showing the counterpart of the regular tax clearance while 
collecting necessary papers from the concerned GP  
 The GP staff use the tax clearance receipt as a necessary pre-requisite for issuing ration cards and/or 
income certificate (which the poorer people need for availing of concessions in hospitals etc.). But this 
does not suffice to trap the richer defaulters as they hardly need such papers form the GPs. 
Poor people pay the tax relatively more regularly because; 
 They cant not afford to pay huge amount of the due amount of tax at one time 
 They need papers mentioned above often than rich people 
 They have less influence on GP members than that of rich no matter in which political group they 
belong to 
3. Lack of transparency in collecting trade registration fee (TRF) 
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BOX 6. 2 
Causes of de-motivation of tax collectors (TCs) and remedial measures to be undertaken as suggested 
by the TCs interviewed 
Causes of gross de-motivation of the TCs 
 
 Job of TCs is not a permanent one and they have to work on commission basis with very little 
amount of monthly basic allowances of Rs.200. 
 Dependence on other job (s) for their living prevents them from spending quality time on the 
job of tax collection. 
 Own revenue generation in general and tax collection in particular is given least importance  
 Public harassment at the time of collecting tax and fees due to non-availability of services. 
 Public harassment at the time of collecting increased rate of tax and fees which are not often 
clearly communicated to the villagers. 
 Public harassment due to asymmetric valuation of old and new properties 
 Due to the absence of well organized tax collecting machinery, a curious mindset of the people 
of considering tax payment at par with donation or paying alms 
 
Remedial measures to be taken to correct this situation as suggested by the TCs 
 
 Proper service should be provided by GPs  
 A income-neutral mechanism should be developed to deal with defaulters  
 Separate administrative mechanism should be developed to tackle old and new defaulters and 
those who are defaulters for more than a decade  
 Before updating rates and structures for valuating properties to be required for imposing LBT, 
GP members should distribute papers to the concerned villagers on which new rates and 
structures are clearly written in order to avoid any harassment at the time of tax collection at 
new rate.  
 The TCs‟ job status should undergo some reform to improve efficiency. 
 A body of neutral assessor should be employed  
 A separate tax cell/department in each GP should be built in order to introduce efficient and 
systematic mechanism of tax collection. 
 GP members should take an overall initiative in administering and collecting tax and non-tax 
revenues. 
 Door to door collection of tax is clearly inefficient; GPs should take initiatives to introduce 
office collection. 
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Appendix: 6.1                      
 
Table: 6.1 Finalization and preparation of draft bye-laws by Gram Panchayats (GPs) in West Bengal 
until June 2005 and political power balance in the GP election held in 2003 
 
Name of  
the 
districts 
Total 
no. of  
GPs in 
each 
district 
Draft & 
final 
bye-laws 
prepared 
by the 
GPs in 
each 
district 
till June 
2005 
Total no. of  
GP 
seats  
in each 
district 
No. of GP 
seats own 
by the 
LF@ 
 
No. of GP 
seats won 
by the 
INC+ 
+TMC+ 
BJP 
(non-LF 
alliance) 
 
No. of 
GP 
seats 
own by 
the 
others 
& 
Indep-
endent 
 
No. of 
GPs  
ruled  
by the 
LF 
              
No. of 
GPs 
ruled by 
the 
INC+ 
BJP+ 
TMC 
(non-LF 
alliance) 
 
 
No. of  
GPs 
ruled 
by the 
others 
& 
Indepe
-ndent 
Per 
capita 
income of 
each 
district  
in  
2000-01 
at 
constant 
prices 
(1993-94) 
Per capita own 
source of revenue 
(OSR)  
of PRIs (GPs, PSs 
and ZPs taken 
together) 
 
(Rs.) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
2002-03 2003-04 
Coochbehar 128 128 1905 1494 
(78.4) 
334 
(17.5) 
77 
(4.1) 
106 
(82.8) 
18 
(14.1) 
4 
(3.1) 
7779.86 4.74 6.09 
Jalpaiguri 146 143 2241 1477 
(65.9) 
673 
(30.0) 
91 
(4.0) 
111 
(76.0) 
35 
(24.0) 
-- 8830.71 6.20 9.12 
Darjeeling 134 134 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10415.88 4.84 6.06 
Uttar 
Dinajpur 
98 98 1529 831 
(54.3) 
615 
(40.2) 
83 
(5.4) 
59 
(60.2) 
37 
(37.7) 
2 
(2.0) 
6778.81 3.48 4.37 
Dakshin 
Dinajpur 
65 65 993 693 
(69.8) 
286 
(28.8) 
12 
(1.2) 
53 
(81.5) 
11 
(16.9) 
1 
(1.5) 
8866.40 7.66 6.17 
Malda 146 140 2232 1097 
(49.1) 
1087 
(48.7) 
47 
(2.1) 
72 
(49.3) 
70 
(47.9) 
4 
(2.7) 
8339.28 6.23 5.64 
Murshi- 
dabad 
254 253 4096 1939 
(47.3) 
2020 
(49.3) 
137 
(3.3) 
115 
(45.2) 
135 
(53.1) 
4 
(1.6) 
8009.30 5.20 4.67 
Nadia 187 187 3114 1498 
(48.1) 
1500 
(48.2) 
116 
(3.7) 
80 ### 
 
43 ### 1* 9606.47 6.65 6.49 
N-24PGS 200 163 3321 1938 
(58.3) 
1251 
(37.7) 
132 
(4.0) 
139 
(69.5) 
55 
(27.5) 
6 
(3.0) 
9440.25 7.23 6.59 
S-24 PGS 312 262 4898 2954 
(60.3) 
1577 
(32.2) 
367 
(7.5) 
194 
(62.2) 
84 
(27.0) 
20** 
(6.4) 
8394.74 4.71 5.03 
Howrah 157 157 2515 1467 
(58.3) 
965 
(38.4) 
83 
(3.3) 
112 
(71.3) 
43 
(27.4) 
2 
(1.3) 
10365.59 10.29 12.02 
Hoogly 210 96 3440 2859 
(83.1) 
547 
(16.0) 
34 
(0.9) 
186 
(88.6) 
24 
(11.4) 
-- 10344.55 13.48 16.96 
West. 
Medini- 
pur 
223 216 3480 2079 
(59.7) 
1284 
(36.9) 
117 
(3.4) 
157 
(70.4) 
65 
(29.1) 
1 
(0.4) 
 
9263.49# 
4.89 6.38 
East. 
Medini- 
pur 
290 281 4073 3359 
(82.5) 
376 
(9.2) 
338 
(8.3) 
251 
(86.5) 
14 
(4.8) 
25 
(8.6) 
11.03 9.65 
Bankura 190 188 2632 2130 
(80.9) 
412 
(15.6) 
90 
(3.4) 
168 
(88.4) 
19 
(10.0) 
3 
(1.6) 
9361.52 3.17 8.73 
Purulia 170 85 2067 1353 
(65.4) 
541 
(26.2) 
173 
(8.4) 
124 
(72.9) 
32 
(18.8) 
14 
(8.2) 
7905.00 2.00 1.54 
Burdwan  277 219 4346 3614 
(83.1) 
670 
(15.4) 
62 
(1.4) 
254 
(91.7) 
23 
(8.3) 
---- 11445.13 13.34 19.34 
Birbhum 167 109 2258 1525 
(67.5) 
637 
(28.2) 
96 
(4.2) 
122 
(73.0) 
40 
(24.0) 
5 
(3.0) 
7738.07 7.67 10.62 
TOTAL 3354 2924 
(87.1) 
49140 32307 
(65.7) 
14775 
(30.0) 
2055 
(4.3) 
 
 
  9778.09## 7.13 8.40 
Source: Information provided by the Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Government of  
West Bengal  
Abbreviations: LF= Left Front; INC= Indian National Congress; TMC= Trinamool Congress; BJP= 
Bharatia Janata Party, PS = Panchayat Samity; ZP = Zilla Parishad; GP= Gram Panchayat 
@ This also include LF supported candidates 
* One GP seat remained undecided, ** 14 GPs remained in ties since equal number of seats was captured by the 
contestant political parties, # It indicates undivided Midnapore;  ## West Bengal state average for the period of 
2000-01; ### As stated in the source. That, however, does not add up to the total described in the column no. 2 
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Table:6.2 Political and economic classification of the GPs selected for the present survey 
High income 
potential GPs 
Total own source of 
revenue of the GPs to total 
revenue@ 
 (%) 
Absolute majority 
enjoyed by the Left 
Front (LF) at GPs 
 
Number of GP seats won by the different 
political parities 
2004-05 
(Actual) 
2005-06 
(Estimated) 
LF TMC+ INC+ 
BJP (non-LF) 
Others Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Belda-2 (16) 12.4 7.9 Shibdaspur  (10) 9 1 -- 10 
Bogula-2   (25) 17.1 17.0 Ranisarai   (13) 13 -- -- 13 
Kamarpukur (21) 15.0 17.7 Kamarpukur (21) 21 -- -- 21 
Duilla (19) 30.2 56.8 Majority enjoyed by the LF 
at GPs but significant 
presence of the non-LF 
    
Average 18.7 24.8 Murardi   (10)* 5 5 -- 10 
Medium income 
potential GPs 
  Mamudpur   (22) 13 8  1 22 
Belda-2 (16)** 12 4 -- 16 
Budhakhali (19) 7.8 8.2 
Mamudpur (22) 12.5 7.6 Absolute majority enjoyed 
by the non-LF 
    
Narayanpur (17) 7.1 6.1 Bogula-2 (25) 4 20 1 25 
Ranisarai (13) 7.7 10.5 Srirampur (24) 4 20 -- 24 
Average 8.8 8.1 Narayanpur (17) 2 14 1 17 
Low income 
 potential GPs 
  Majority enjoyed by the 
non-LF but significant 
presence of the LF 
    
Labhpur-2 (11) 7.7 5.7 Duilla (19) 5 14 -- 19 
Srirampur (24) 4.9 3.9 Labhpur-2 (11) 5 6 -- 11 
Shibdaspur (10) 2.5 6.9 Budhakhali (19) 7 12 -- 19 
Murardi (10)# 1.7 2.0      
Average 4.2 4.6      
Total GP seats (207)   Total GP seats (207) 100 104 3 207 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
Note: Figures in brackets in column 1 & 4 denote total number of GP members elected in the respective GP 
@ Total revenue of GPs of the respective year denote the total revenue excluding initial balance from the previous year 
*In Murardi, equal number of GP members belongs to the LF and non-LF but the GP is ruled by the LF 
** We categorized Belda-2 GP under the group titled  „Majority enjoyed by the LF at GPs but significant presence of 
the non-LF‟ since the information provided by the Panchayati Raj, Paschimbanga Sarkarer Traimasik Mukhapotro, 
Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Government of West Bengal,  No. 1 (40), July-September, 2003, p. 
114 , six GP members is elected from the non-LF alliance in Belda –2, but having arrived there we found that only four 
GP members belong to the non-LF instead of six. Subject to the limited time period we had for our field survey, we had 
to carry on our field survey despite the fact that compared to other GPs belong to this group, Belda-2 GP does not have 
significant number of the opposition GP members. 
#Total own source of revenue (TOSR) of this GP  as percent to total revenue are based on estimated budget for both the 
years 2004-05 & 2005-06  
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Table: 6.3 General information about selected GPs 
  
 Name of the 
 GPs 
Political 
position of  
GPs 
District/ 
Block 
Total no. of 
GP 
members 
Total GP 
members 
intervi- 
ewed 
Total 
electors of 
the GPs@ 
Total 
electors 
intervie-
wed 
GPs at a glance as per the information provided 
by the elected GP members of the respective 
GPs 
 
Srirampur Non-LF 
Dominated 
Barddhaman/ 
Purbasthali-1 
24 20 17,000 100 
(0.6) 
Out of 20 constituencies, 7 are semi-urban in 
nature. Weaving (handicraft) related economic 
activity occupies important position#. Small 
section of population are engaged in cultivation 
and land is mostly cultivated twice a year 
Bogula-2 Non-LF 
Dominated 
Nadia/ 
Hanskhali 
25 21 17,796 101 
(0.6) 
Out of 22 constituencies, 14 are semi-urban in 
nature. Main business center of Hanskhali 
Block, in the District of Nadia with a 
undergraduate college and hospital. Cultivation 
along with service and business occupy major 
economic activities. Land is cultivated twice and 
in some cases thrice a year 
Kamarpukur LF 
dominated 
Hoogly/ 
Goghat-2 
21 20 15,028 111 
(0.7) 
Out of 17 constituencies, 8 are urban in nature. 
Cultivation occupies one of the main economic 
activities along with business and service. Land 
is double and triple cropping 
Duilla Non-LF 
Dominated 
Howrah/ 
Sankrile 
19 17 13,539 104 
(0.8) 
The GP is urban in nature and all the   
constituencies (16) are urbanized. No 
cultivation. Casual labor, informal sectors, 
business and service are the major forms of  
economic activity in the area  
Shibdaspur LF 
dominated 
North 24 PGS/ 
Barackpur1 
10 10 7,092 101 
(1.4) 
Poorest GP of Barackpore-1 block.  Cultivation 
is the main occupation. Roughly 50% of total 
land is double cropping. Significant number of 
population is landless and acute poverty 
persists in the area 
Mamudpur LF 
dominated 
North 24 PGS/ 
Barackpur-1 
22 21 16,645 108 
(0.6) 
Out of 15 constituencies, 4 are semi-urban in 
nature. Cultivation is the main economic 
activity along with business and service. Land is 
mainly double cropping.   
Belda-2 LF 
dominated 
West Medinipore/ 
Narayangarh 
16 14 21, 000 
 
113 
(0.5) 
Of 14 constituencies, 6are urbanized in nature.  
Business, service, informal sectors along with 
cultivation occupy major areas of economic 
activities. Land is mainly single cropping 
Labhpur-2 Non-LF 
Dominated 
Birbhum/ 
Labhpur 
11 10 7, 710 102 
(1.3) 
Cultivation occupies major area of economic 
activities. Land is  mainly single cropping but 
some are of double cropping ## 
Ranisarai LF 
dominated 
West  Medinipur/ 
Narayangarh 
13 13 8, 874 100 
(1.1) 
Cultivation is the main occupation. Land is 
single cropping 
Budhakhali Non-LF 
Dominated 
South 24 PGS/ 
Namkhana 
19 16 13,530 107 
(0.8) 
Cultivation is one of the main occupations and 
is mainly single cropping.  Flood prone area. 
Erosion causes destruction of river banks 
affects cultivation very much 
Narayanpur Non-LF 
Dominated 
South 24 PGS/ 
Namkhana 
17 17  12,721 103 
(0.8) 
Out of 15 constituencies, 2 are semi-urban in 
nature. Cultivation is one of the main 
occupations along with catching fish and land is 
single cropping. Flood prone area and erosion 
causes destruction of river banks affects 
cultivation very much### 
Murardi LF 
dominated 
Purulia/Saturi 10 9 13,500 102 
(0.7) 
Presence of acute poverty. No business 
activities. No irrigation. Very few lands to the 
cultivators. Most are landless people and the 
rest are big cultivators. Large number of 
landless labors goes outside of the region in 
search for work.  
Total -- -- 207 188  
 
 1252 
(0.8) 
 
-- 
 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
@ As per the information received from the GP at the time of the field survey, # Weaving related industries 
occupy one of the main economic activities in this area.  ## Land is mainly single cropping with very few double 
cropping areas. ### This area produces plenty of vegetables and one of the main occupations is fishery.   
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Table: 6.4 Democratic measures pursued by the GPs in preparing bye-laws  
 
Name of the  
GPs 
 
 
GPs 
rul-
ed 
by 
 
Discussion about bye-laws held in 
the board meeting consists of  
Gram Panchayat members 
Discussion about bye-laws took 
place in Gram Sansad (GSN) and 
Gram Sabha (GS) 
Notice was put up for 45 
days and/or 
announcement made 
about bye-laws 
No. of GP 
members 
aware of the 
passing of 
draft and/ 
or final bye-
laws 
  
No. of GP 
members 
aware of 
different 
types of user 
charges 
included in 
the bye-laws 
Yes 
 
Par- 
tly 
yes* 
No To-
tal 
Yes Par- 
tly 
yes* 
No Tot- 
al 
Yes No Tot- 
al 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Srirampur   Non
-LF 
19  -- 1 20 9 -- 11 20 6 14 20 14  (20) 2 (20) 
Bogula-2  Non
-LF 
15 -- 6 21 7 -- 14 21 4 17 21 11  (21) 2 (21) 
Duilla  Non
-LF 
17 -- -- 17 13 -- 4 17 14 3 17 17  (17) 2 (17) 
Labhpur-2  Non
-LF 
9 1 -- 10 3 2 5 10 3 7 10 7    (10) 2 (10) 
Budhakhali  Non
-LF 
13 -- 3 16 6 3 7 16 5 11 16 11  (16) 2 (16) 
Narayanpur  Non
-LF 
15 1 1 17 10 -- 7 17 5 12 17 14  (17) 2 (17) 
Sub total for 
non-LF 
(%) 
 88 
(87.1) 
2 
(2.0) 
11 
(10.9) 
101 
(100) 
48 
(47.5) 
5 
(5.0) 
48 
(47.5) 
101 
(100) 
37 
(36.6) 
64 
(63.3) 
101 
(100) 
74  (101) 
(73.2) 
12 (101) 
(11.8) 
Kamar- 
pukur  
LF 4 -- 16 20 4 -- 16 20 1 19 20 4    (20) 1  (20) 
Shibdaspur  LF 2 -- 8 10 1 -- 9 10 5 5 10 1    (10) 1 (10) 
Mamudpur  LF 13 1 7 21 5 1 15 21 2 19 21 5    (21) 2  (21) 
Belda-2   LF 13 -- 1 14 4 1 9 14 8 6 14 8    (14) 2  (14) 
Ranisarai   LF 10 -- 3 13 7 -- 6 13 8 5 13 11  (13) 1 (13) 
Murardi  LF 7 -- 2 9 2 -- 7 9 1 8 9  2     (9) 1  (9) 
Sub total for 
LF (%) 
 49 
(56.3) 
1 
(1.1) 
37 
(42.6) 
87 
(100) 
23 
(26.4) 
2 
(2.3) 
62 
(71.3) 
87 
(100) 
25 
(28.7) 
62 
(71.3) 
87 
(100) 
31   (87) 
(35.6) 
8 (87) 
(9.2) 
Total (188) 
(%) 
 137 
(72.9) 
3 
(1.6) 
48 
(25.5) 
188 
(100) 
71 
37.8 
7 
3.7 
110 
58.5 
188 
(100) 
61 
(32.5) 
127 
(67.5) 
188 
(100) 
105 (188) 
(55.8) 
20 (188) 
(10.6) 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
Note: Figures in brackets in column 14 & 15 denote total number of GP members interviewed in the respective GP 
*‟Partly  yes‟ in the column 4 refers to the GP members, as described by them, those who have had just the information 
about finalization of the bye-law taken by the respective GP and those who were just conveyed regarding this matter in 
the board meeting. „Partly yes‟ in the column 8 refers to the GP members who informed villagers regarding this matter 
at Gram Sabha (GS) and/or Gram Sansad (GSN) without holding any further discussion  
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Table: 6.5 Democratic norms pursued in preparing bye-laws  
 
Name of the 
GPs 
Number of GP members 
interviewed 
 
GPs  
ruled by 
No. of GP 
members said 
that discussion 
about bye-laws 
held in the board 
meeting 
No. of GP 
members said 
that discussion 
about bye-laws 
took place in GS 
and/or GSN 
No. of GP 
members said that 
notice being put 
up and/or 
announcement 
made about bye-
laws 
No. of  GP members 
aware of preparing 
final and/or draft bye-
laws  
LF Non-
LF 
Total LF Non-
LF 
LF Non-
LF 
LF Non-LF LF Non-LF 
Bogula-2 
 
4 17 21 Non-LF 3 (4) 12 (17) 1 
(4) 
6 (17) 1 (4) 4 (17) 2 (4) 9 (17) 
Duilla 4 13 17 Non-LF 4 (4) 13 (13) 3 (4) 10 (13) 1 (4) 13 (13) 3 (4) 11 (13) 
Budhakhali 
 
4 
 
12 
 
16 Non-LF 4 (4) 9  (12) 2 (4) 6 (12) 0 (4) 5 (12) 3 (4) 8 (12) 
Narayanpur 
 
2 15 17 Non-LF 2 (2) 14 (15) 0 (2) 10 (15) 0 (2) 5 (15) 1 (2) 13 (15) 
Labhpur-2 
 
5 5 10 Non-LF 5 (5) 5 (5) 2 (5) 3 (5) 0 (5) 3 (5) 4 (5) 3 (5) 
Srirampur 4 16 20 Non-LF 4 (4) 15 (16) 0 (4) 9 (16) 0 (4) 6 (16) 2 (4) 12 (16) 
Subtotal 23 78 101  22 (23) 68 (78) 8(23) 44 (78) 2 (23) 36 (78) 15 (23) 56 (78) 
% -- -- -- -- 95.6 87.2 34.8 56.4 8.7 46.2 65.2 71.8 
Mamudpur  
 
12 9 21 LF 8 (12) 6 (9) 4 (12) 2 (9) 2 (12) 0 (9) 5 (12) 0 (9) 
Murardi  
 
4 5 9 LF 3 (4) 4 (5) 2 (4) 0 (5) 1 (4) 0 (5) 2 (4) 0 (5) 
Ranisarai  13 0 13 LF 10 (13) 0 (0) 7 (13) 0 (0) 8 (13) 0 (0) 11 (13) 0 (0) 
Shibdaspur  
 
9 1 10 LF 2 (9) 0 (1) 2 (9) 0 (1) 5 (9) 0 (1) 1 (9) 0 (1) 
Kamarpukur  20 
 
0 
 
20 
 
LF 4 (20) 0 (0) 4 (20) 0 (0) 1 (20) 0 (0) 4 (20) 0 (0) 
Belda-2 11 3 14 LF 10 (11) 3 (3) 5 (11) 0 (3) 8 (11) 0 (3) 7 (11) 1 (3) 
Subtotal  69 18 87  37 (69) 13 (18) 24 (69) 2 (18) 25 (69) 0 (18) 30 (69) 1 (18) 
(%) -- -- -- -- 53.6 72.2 34.8 11.1 36.2 -- (43.5 (5.5) 
Total 92 96 188  59 (92) 81 (96) 32 (92) 46 (96) 27 (92) 36 (96) 45 (92) 57 (96) 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
Note: Figures in brackets denote total number of LF and non-LF GP members in the respective GP  
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Table:  6.6 Democratic procedures pursued by GPs in preparing bye-laws among electors  
 
Name of  
the GPs 
GPs  
ruled by 
Number of 
villagers 
took part in 
the 
discussion as 
regards the 
bye-laws at 
GSN and/or 
GS of the 
respective 
GP 
Number  of 
villagers 
aware of the 
notice to be  
put up for 45 
days and/or 
announcement 
to be made 
about the bye-
laws of the 
respective GP 
Number of 
villagers who 
are aware 
about the 
present status 
& different 
sections of the 
bye-laws of the 
respective GP 
Virtual ignorance of villagers about  bye-laws undertaken in 
their GPs  but different sources of knowledge about it only 
with reference to the protest staged by the opposition in 2003 
Have never 
heard about 
bye-laws 
(%) 
Saw it in 
news 
paper 
and other 
public 
medias 
(%) 
Heard it 
from fellow 
villagers and 
from the 
opposition 
party  
activists 
located 
nearby 
(%) 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Srirampur  Non-LF None (100) None (100) None (100) 29.0 (29) 10.0 (10) 61.0 (61) 100.0 (100) 
Bogula-2  Non-LF None (101) None (101) None (101) 24.7 (25)  9.9 (10)  65.3 (66) 100.0 (101) 
Duilla Non-LF None (104) None (104) None (104) 76.0 (79) 16.3 (17) 7.7 (8) 100.0 (104) 
Labhpur-2 Non-LF None (102) None (102) None (102) 39.2 (40)  9.8 (10) 50.9 (52) 100.0 (102) 
Budhakhali Non-LF None (107) None (107) None (107) 74.8 (80) 3.7 (4) 21.5 (23) 100.0 (107) 
Narayanpur Non-LF None (103) None (103) None (103) 74.7 (77) 10.7(11) 14.6 (15) 100.0 (103) 
Subtotal for 
Non-LF 
           (617)           (617)           (617)  53.5 (330) 10.0 (62)  36.5 (225) 100.0  (617) 
Kamarpukur  LF None (111) None (111) None (111) 81.9 (91) 10.8 (12) 7.3 (8) 100.0 (111) 
Shibdaspur LF None (101) None (101) None (101) 51.5 (52) 17.8 (18) 30.7 (31) 100.0 (101) 
Mamudpur LF None (108) None (108) None (108) 65.7 (71) 13.9 (15) 20.3 (22) 100.0 (108) 
Belda-2 LF None (113) None (113) None (113) 67.3 (76) 15.9 (18) 16.8 (19) 100.0 (113) 
Ranisarai LF None (100) None (100) None (100) 95.0 (95) 2.0 (2) 3.0 (3) 100.0 (100) 
Murardi LF None (102) None (102) None (102) 75.5 (77) 9.8 (10) 14.7 (15) 100.0 (102) 
Subtotal for LF            (635)           (635)          (635) 72.7 (462) 11.8 (75) 15.4 (98) 100.0   (635) 
(Total)           (1252)          (1252)          (1252) 63.2 (792) 11.0 (137) 25.8 (323) 100.0 (1252) 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
Note: Figures in brackets in column 3 to 5 & 9 indicate total number of villagers interviewed in the 
respective GP and figures in brackets in column 6 to 8 indicate number of villagers given opinion in respect 
to the mentioned query 
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Table: 6.7 Acceptance of bye-laws designed for imposition of user charges by electors as well as GP 
members 
 
                           
Name of 
the GPs 
 
(Total GP 
members 
interviewed) 
 
GPs ruled 
by  
 
 
 
Acceptance of further taxation by the electors 
interviewed 
Acceptance of further taxation by the GP members 
Total no. of 
villagers 
accepted 
relevant 
portion  of 
bye-laws 
under the 
present 
economic 
and service 
condition 
Whether the electors feel that in the 
given economic situation of the 
villagers, if enhancement of services is 
linked with user charges will result in 
concomitant increase in tax collection; 
Total no. of  
GP 
members 
accepted 
relevant 
portion  of 
bye-laws 
under the 
present 
economic 
and service 
condition 
Whether the GP members feel that in 
the given economic situation of the 
villagers, if enhancement of services is 
linked with user charges will result in 
concomitant increase in tax collection; 
Yes No Total 
 Yes  
(%) 
No  
 
(due to 
present 
economic 
backward
ness)   
(%) 
Total due to 
present  
econo- 
mic 
backwar
dness 
due to 
unwilli
ngness 
of elec- 
tors 
in  
paying 
taxes  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Srirampur (20) Non-LF None (100) 70.0  (70) 30.0 (30) 100 (100) None 19 1 -- 20 
Bogula-2 (21) Non-LF None (101) 71.2 (72) 28.8   (29) 100 (101)  None 10 2 9 21 
Labhpur-2 (10) Non-LF None (102) 86.2  (88) 13.8 (14) 100 (102) None 7 1 2 10 
Duilla (17) Non-LF None (104) 79.8 (83) 20.2 (21) 100 (104) None 12 2 3 17 
Budhakhali (16) Non-LF None (107) 66.3 (71) 33.7 (36) 100 (107) None 15 -- 1 16 
Narayanpur (17) Non-LF None (103)  83.5  (86) 16.5 (17) 100 (103) None 17 -- -- 17 
Subtotal for Non-
LF (101) 
 (617)  76.1 (470) 23.8 (147) 100 (470) 0 
(0) 
80 
(79.2) 
6 
(6.0) 
15 
(14.8) 
101 
(100) 
Kamarpukur (20) LF None (111) 74.7  (83) 25.3 (28) 100 (111) 2 5 4 11 20 
Shibdaspur (10) LF None (101) 90.0 (91) 10.0 (10) 100 (101) 1 8 2 -- 10 
Mamudpur (21) LF None (108) 82.4 (89) 17.6 (19) 100 (108) 1 17 3 1 21 
Belda-2  (14) LF None (113) 82.3 (93) 17.7 (20) 100 (113) None 9 1 4 14 
Ranisarai (13) LF None (100) 97.0 (97) 3.0 (3) 100 (100) None 11 2 -- 13 
Murardi (9) LF None (102)  96.4 (98) 3.6 (4) 100 (102) None 8 1 -- 9 
Subtotal for LF 
(87) 
 (635) 86.7 (551) 13.3 (84) 100 (635) 4 
(4.6) 
58 
(66.6) 
13 
(15.0) 
16 
18.4) 
87 
(100) 
Tot1 (188)           (1252) 81.5 (1021) 18.5 (231) 100 (1252) 4 
(2.1) 
138 
(73.4) 
19 
(10.1) 
31 
(16.5) 
188 
(100) 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
 
Note: Figures in brackets in column 1 denote total no. of GP members and column 6 denote total number of villagers 
interviewed in the respective GP and figures in brackets in column 3 to 5 denote total number of villagers provided 
opinion in respect to the query 
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Table: 6.8 Opposition against the introduction of bye-laws as expressed by the electors at GSN and GS  
 
Name of the 
GPs 
 
(Total GP 
members 
interviewed) 
GP s 
ruled by 
Potential opposition against  bye-
laws expressed by villagers as 
perceived by the GP members 
Total 
no. of 
GP 
mem
bers 
discu
ssed 
about 
bye-
laws 
at 
GSN 
and/o
r GS 
Discussion 
at GSN 
and/or GS 
didn’t 
take place 
Total 
GP members 
interv- 
iewed 
As perceived by the Pradhan of the respective GP  
Mostly 
opposed 
 
 
First they 
opposed 
but later on 
they were 
persuaded 
Not 
opposed 
 Bye-laws was finalized due to; While 
finalizing  
bye-laws 
whether the 
GP  faced 
stiff 
opposition 
from the 
opposition 
GP 
members  
Administrative 
convenience while 
in principle they 
oppose any kind of 
further taxation in 
the form of user 
charges 
Own source 
of revenues 
of the GP 
should be 
enhanced 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Srirampur   
(20) 
Non-LF 9 -- -- 9 11 20 X  No 
Bogula-2  
(21) 
Non-LF 7 -- -- 7 14 21 X  No 
Duilla  
(17) 
Non-LF 13 -- -- 13 4 17 X  No 
Labhpur-2  
(10) 
Non-LF 5 -- -- 5 5 10 X  ** 
Budhakhali  
(16) 
Non-LF 8 1  9 7 16 X  No 
Narayanpur  
(17) 
Non-LF 10 -- -- 10 7 17 X  Yes 
Subtotal for 
Non-LF 
(101) 
 52 
(98.1) 
 
1 
(1.9) 
 
0  
(0) 
 
53 
(100) 
48 
 
 
101 
 
 
   
Kamarpukr  
(20) 
LF 0 4 -- 4 16 20  X NA 
Shibdaspur  
(10) 
LF 0 -- 1 1 9 10 X  No 
Mamudpur  
(21) 
LF 6 -- -- 6 15 21 X  Yes 
Belda-2   
(14) 
LF 4 1 -- 5 9 14  X Yes 
Ranisarai   
(13) 
LF 4 -- 3 7 6 13  X NA 
Murardi  
(9) 
LF 2 -- -- 2 7 9 X  Yes 
Subtotal for 
LF (87) 
 16 
(64.0) 
5  
(20.0) 
 
4  
(16.0) 
 
25 
(100) 
62  
 
87 
 
   
Total = 188  68 (87.2) 6 (7.7) 4 (5.1) 78 (100) 110  188     
Source: Data collected from the field study  
** Neither they consented nor they opposed vehemently, rather suggested indifference in this respect 
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Table: 6.9 Constraints as perceived by the GP members in accepting additional taxation 
 
Name of the 
 GPs 
(Total GP 
members 
interviewed) 
GPs 
ruled 
by 
 
                            Constraints as faced by the GP members in pursuing bye-laws in general and generating own revenues in particular 
Fear of losing political support  Lack of reliance of villagers on 
GPs as an efficient  and neutral 
administrative body  
Proximity to the villagers Misuse of resources 
available to GPs as 
perceived by villagers 
Yes  Partly 
Yes 
No Tot- 
al 
Yes Par-
tly 
Yes 
No Total Yes Part-
ly 
Yes 
No Tot-
al 
Yes Par-
tly 
Yes 
No Tot-
al 
Srirampur  
(20) 
Non-
LF 
6 2 12 20 1 4 15 20 13 4 3 20 4 1 15 20 
Bogula-2  
(21) 
Non-
LF 
4 1 16 21 -- 4 17 21 6 8 7 21 3 4 14 21 
Duilla  
(17) 
Non-
LF 
3 5 9 17 -- 4 13 17 11 5 1 17 1 5 11 17 
Labhpur-2 
 (10) 
Non-
LF 
6 - 4 10 -- -- 10 10 7 3 -- 10 -- 3 7 10 
Budhakhali 
(16) 
Non-
LF 
2 3 11 16 -- 1 15 16 3 11 2 16 3 5 8 16 
Narayanpur 
(17) 
Non-
LF 
2 5 10 17 3 -- 14 17 4 12 1 17 7 4 6 17 
Subtotal for 
non-LF (%) 
 23 
(22. 
8) 
16 
(15. 
8) 
62 
(61.
4) 
101 
(100) 
4 
(4 
.0) 
13 
(13.
0) 
84 
(83. 
0) 
101 
(100) 
44 
(43.
6) 
43 
(42. 
6) 
14 
(13.
8) 
101 
(100
) 
18 
(17. 
8) 
22 
(21.
8) 
61 
(60. 
4) 
101 
(100
) 
Kamar- 
pukur (20) 
LF 2 -- 18 20 1 -- 19 20 5 8 7 20 4 -- 16 20 
Shibdaspur 
(10) 
LF 1 3 6 10 -- -- 10 10 5 1 4 10 3 3 4 10 
Mamudpur 
(21) 
LF 3 2 16 21 4 5 12 21 9 7 5 21 2 5 14 21 
Belda-2  
(14) 
LF 1 1 12 14 3 1 10 14 2 11 1 14 2 6 6 14 
Ranisarai  
(13) 
LF -- -- 13 13 -- 1 12 13 2 7 4 13 1 3 9 13 
Murardi (9) LF 2 1 6 9 1 3 5 9 2 7 -- 9 3 1 5 9 
Subtotal for 
LF (%) 
 9 
(10. 
3) 
7 
(8. 
1) 
71 
(81.
6) 
87 
(100) 
9 
(10.
3) 
10 
(11.
5) 
68 
(78 
.2) 
87 
(100) 
25 
(28.
7) 
41 
(47. 
1) 
21 
(24.
2) 
87 
(100
) 
15 
(17. 
2) 
18 
(20.
7) 
54 
(62. 
1) 
87 
(100
) 
Total =188 
(%) 
 32 
(17. 
1) 
23 
(12. 
2) 
133 
(70.
7) 
188 
(100) 
13 
(7. 
0) 
23 
(12.
2) 
152 
(80. 
8) 
188 
(100) 
69 
(36.
7) 
84 
(44. 
7) 
35 
(18. 
6) 
188 
(100
) 
33 
(17. 
5) 
40 
(21.
3) 
115 
(61. 
2) 
188 
(100
) 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
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Table: 6.10   Tax collectors’ opinion 
 
Name of  
the GPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GPs 
ruled 
by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General information as regards TCs Reasons for de-motivation of TCs in collecting taxes 
Name of 
the TCs 
 
 
 
Since 
when 
they 
have 
been 
working 
 
 
 
 
Other 
professional 
engagement 
of the TCs 
besides tax 
collection 
 
 
 
Approxi- 
mate 
monthly 
income of 
TCs 
from 
collecting  
taxes 
 
 
 
TCs feel 
completely de-
motivated in 
their job lies in 
lack of 
conducive 
working 
environment 
and poor 
remuneration 
The job of  
TCs 
should be  
made 
permanent  
Even if it is not possible to 
give the job of TCs a 
permanent status, 
following measures can be 
taken which would 
enhance their 
remuneration as perceived 
by TCs 
M1 
  
M2 
 
 
M3 
 
Budhakhali  
  
Non-
LF 
 
KM 1973-74 Agricultural 
labor 
Rs.500 Yes Yes X X X 
AM 1973-74 Agricultural 
labor & 
small farmer  
Rs. 550 Yes Yes 
 
X X 
 
X 
 
Narayanpur 
 
Non-
LF 
 
N K 1976-77 Cultivator Rs. 550 Yes Yes X X X 
PKS 1983-84 Small 
Service 
Rs. 500 Yes Yes X X X 
Duilla 
 
Non-
LF 
 
SM 2000-01 Private 
Tutor 
Rs. 1500 Yes Yes X X X 
PK 1978-79 Small 
Business 
Rs. 2500 Yes Yes X X X 
Bogula-2 
 
Non-
LF 
 
TC1 2003-4 Decoration 
Business 
Rs. 2250 
 
Yes Yes 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
TC2 2003-04 No other 
occupation 
Rs. 1,500 Yes Yes X X X 
Labhpur-2 
 
Non-
LF 
BKD 1982-83 Cultivator Rs. 800 Yes Yes X X X 
Srirampur 
 
Non-
LF 
TC1 
SRI 
1987-88 Managing 
inherited 
family 
properties 
Rs.1500 Yes Yes X X X 
Shibdaspur LF MAA 1972-73 Cultivator Rs. 1200 Yes Yes  X X X 
Mamudpur 
 
LF 
 
SR 1988-89 No other 
occupation 
Rs. 2200 Yes Yes X X X 
TH 2000-01 No other 
occupation 
Rs. 2200 Yes Yes X X X 
Murardi LF No Tax Collector 
Ranisarai 
 
LF 
 
AKD 2001-02 Cultivator Rs.500 NC Yes -- X X 
Belda-2 
 
LF 
 
BD 1977-78 Cultivator Rs. 1500 Yes Yes X X X 
SO 1998-99 No other 
occupation 
Rs.1000 Yes Yes X X X 
Kamarpukur 
 
LF BB 2003-04 Priest Rs. 2200 Yes Yes X X X 
  AK 2004-05 Private 
Tutor 
Rs. 2250 Yes Yes X X X 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
Note:  NC= No Comment 
 
 
 M1= Proper mechanism should be built up to deal with defaulters particularly the rich and the influential 
which would in turn increase monthly remuneration of TCs by pushing up total tax collection made by the 
TCs in the respective GPs.  
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 M2= Neutral body of assessor should be employed entrusted with the task of updating valuation of properties 
at a particular periodicity, bringing parity into the valuation of new and old buildings and correcting the trend 
of under-assessment in valuation of properties in general and properties of rich and influential people in 
particular. That would in turn increase monthly remuneration of TCs by pushing up total tax collection made 
by the TCs. 
 
 M3=Responsibility for collecting trade registration fee should be vested with TCs instead of the present 
system of being collected by the secretary of the respective GP whereby it is not included in total own 
revenue generation of GPs made by the TCs and in effect lowers their monthly remuneration. During the 
post-bye-laws period when trade registration fee is supposed to be based on types of business and amount of 
capital invested on these businesses located within the jurisdiction of the respective GP instead of flat rate of  
Rs. 10, that was in place earlier, possibility of realization of higher amount from trade registration fee would 
in turn open up chances of enhancement in the monthly remuneration of TCs. In addition, other non-tax 
revenues that are collected by the GP staff instead of the TCs such as no objection certificate for running 
trade, wholesale or retail within it‟s jurisdiction, pollution free certificate, fees for constructing new building 
or making any addition and alteration of the existing building should be brought under the total own revenue 
generation of GPs on which commission of the TCs is determined.  
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Table: 6.11 Suggested Changes in tax collectors (TCs) activities  
 
Name of the GPs 
 
(Total number of 
GP members 
interviewed) 
 
GPs 
ruled by  
Number of TCs should be increased  
along with separate tax cell  should be 
introduced within GP administration if 
bye-laws to be implemented 
In order to raise the efficiency in the job of tax collection 
TCs should be employed on 
Yes  No Total Permanent 
basis 
Only on 
commission 
basis 
Permanence    
+ 
Commission 
Total 
Budhakhali (16) Non-LF 15 1 16 12 4 -- 16 
Narayanpur (17) Non-LF 16 1 17 5 1 11 17 
Duilla (17) Non-LF 16 1 17 7 3 7 17 
Bogula-2 (21) Non-LF 14 7 21 6 1 14 21 
Labhpur-2 (10) Non-LF 10 - 10 2 2 6 10 
Srirampur (20) Non-LF 18 2 20 4 4 12 20 
Subtotal for LF 
(%) 
 
 89 
(88.1) 
12 
(11.9) 
101 
(100) 
36 
(35.6) 
15 
(14.8) 
50 
(49.5) 
101 
(100) 
Ranisarai (13) LF 13 -- 13 5 - 8 13 
Belda-2 (14) LF 12 2 14 2 6 6 14 
Kamarpukur (20) LF 20 - 20 4 3 13 20 
Shibdaspur (10) LF 8 2 10 6 1 3 10 
Mamudpur (21) LF 20 1 21 13 1 7 21 
Murardi (9) LF Presently no tax collector is working in this GP and no plan for employing 
any 
Subtotal for Non-
LF (%) 
 73 
(93.6) 
5 
(6.4) 
78 
(100) 
30 
(38.5) 
11 
(14.1) 
37 
(47.4) 
78 
(100) 
Total 
(%) 
 162 
(90.5) 
17 
(9.5) 
179 
(100) 
66 
(36.9) 
26 
(14.5) 
87 
(48.6) 
179 
(100) 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
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Table: 6.12a Structural as well as functional lacunae in tax collection  
 
Name of the 
GPs 
GPs 
ruled by 
Lack of political 
will and  
initiative taken 
by GP members 
in collecting and  
administering 
taxes which 
prevents them 
from collecting 
tax revenues to 
it’s full potential 
 
Lack of political w
dealing with defau
general and rich an
influential defaulte
with the supporters o
party in power  in 
particular 
There  is no 
schemes in 
making  the 
old 
defaulters 
operative 
and no legal 
action is 
taken 
against 
defaulters  
 
Transparency in 
administering taxes is 
often lacking as GP 
members are reluctant 
in discussing 
contentions issues like 
proper valuation of  
properties, problem of 
defaulters and upward 
revision of valuation of 
properties,  at GS and 
GSN meeting 
Valuation of 
properties is 
often made at 
the discretion 
of GP 
members 
without 
following any 
stipulated rules 
which is often 
politically 
influenced 
Vehicle 
registration 
fee is taken 
regularly 
(TR) not 
taken (NT)  
at all or is 
extremely 
irregular 
(IR) and all 
types  of 
vehicles are 
not covered 
TCs are 
ignorant 
 about the  
standard 
norms for 
assessing 
trade 
registration 
fee  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Budhakhali Non-LF  
1. KM  X X X X X X (IR) X 
2. AM X X X X X X (IR) X 
Narayanpur Non-LF  
1. NK  X X X X X X (IR) X 
2. PKS X X X X X X (IR) X 
Duilla Non-LF  
1. SM  X X X X X# X (NT) X 
2. PK X X X X X # X (NT) X 
Bogula-2 Non-LF        
1. TC1  NC NC NC NC NC X (NT) X 
2. TC2 NC X NC NC NC X (NT) X 
Srirampur Non-LF  
1. TC1 
 X X X X X X (TR) X 
Labhpur-2 Non-LF  
1. BD 
 X X X X X X (NT) X 
Kamarpukur LF  
1. BB  X X X NC X# X (NT)  
2. AK  X X X NC X# X (NT) X 
Shibdaspur LF  
1. MAA 
 X X X X X X (NT) X 
Mamudpur LF        
1.SSR 
 X X X X X X (NT) X 
2.TH X X X X X X (NT) X 
Murardi LF No Tax collector 
Ranisarai LF  
1. AKD  NC NC NC NC NC X  (TR) X 
Belda-2 LF  
1. BM  X X NC X X# X (IR) X 
2. SO  X X NC X X# X (IR) X 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
Note: IR in brackets of column 8 refers to irregular collection of vehicle registration fee and NT refers to the fee  is not 
taken and  TR refers to the fee is taken regularly ; NC= No Comment 
# Lack of parity in valuating new and old buildings exists in GPs like Belda-2, Duilla and Kamarpukur. Valuation of  
new buildings is made at current price while that of older ones of the same type at backdated price. Monotosh Mallik , 
CPI (M) GP member of Belda-2 described the problem of under valuation of properties in Belda-2 GP.  According to 
him, valuation of property was last done way back in 1988 and was not updated since then. New buildings which were 
constructed after that period were assessed at current rate while that of the old buildings are remained at the rate fixed 
in 1988. Valuation of the old properties located near the National Highway (construction of which is underway) would 
be much higher in near future but no steps have so far been taken to update the valuation of such properties with a view 
to impose land & building tax due to lack of political will of the GP. 
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Table: 6.12b  Lacunae continued… 
 
Name of  
 the GPs 
GPs 
ruled by 
 
Name of the 
TCs of the 
respective 
GP 
Existence 
of under- 
valuation 
of 
properties 
required 
for 
imposing 
LBT 
(extent of 
under-
valuation 
as % of 
total) 
Regressive tendencies in tax collection and assessment Presence of 
significant 
number of 
defaulters 
 
 
(% of 
defaulters to 
total tax 
payers) 
Problem of 
under-
assessment  
in collection 
of LBT 
 
(% of total 
collection 
from LBT 
to total 
assessment) 
 
 
Problem of under-
valuation of properties 
required for imposing  
LBT  is present; 
Number of defaulters  is 
present; 
more  
among 
rich  
 
(extent of 
under-
valuaatio
n as % of 
total) 
relatively 
less  
among   
 poor  
  
(extent of 
under- 
valuation 
ion as % of 
total) 
more among 
rich@ 
 
(% of rich 
defaulters to 
total) 
relatively 
less 
among poor 
 
(% of poor 
defaulters 
to total) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Budhakhali 
 
Non-LF 
 
KM  X 
 
X 
 
X X X X 
(25) 
X 
  
AM X 
 
X X X X X 
(70) 
X 
(30) 
Narayanpur 
 
Non-LF 
 
NK X 
 
X 
(65) 
X 
(10) 
X 
(75) 
X 
(25) 
X X 
(40) 
PKS X 
 
X 
(60) 
X 
(10) 
X 
(90) 
X 
(10) 
X 
 
X 
(65) 
Duilla 
 
Non-LF 
 
SM X 
 
X X X 
(85) 
X 
(15) 
X X 
PK X 
 
X X X X X 
(25) 
X 
Bogula-2 
 
Non-LF 
 
TC1 X 
(60) 
X X Defaulters among poor and 
rich are equal 
X 
(65) 
X 
TC2 X Under-valuation of 
properties is equally 
prominent both in case of 
rich and poor 
X X X 
 
(40) 
X 
Labhpur-2 
 
Non-LF 
 
BKD X 
(80) 
X 
(70) 
X 
(20) 
X X X X 
(28) 
Srirampur 
 
Non-LF 
 
TC 1 X 
 
X X X X X 
(35) 
X 
Shibdaspur LF MAA X 
 
X X X 
 
X 
 
X 
(42) 
X 
(70) 
Mamudpur 
 
LF 
 
SSR X 
(80) 
X 
(70) 
X 
(20) 
X 
(70) 
X 
(30) 
X 
(50) 
X 
(38) 
TH X 
(40) 
X X X 
(70) 
X 
(30) 
X 
(50) 
X 
(38) 
Murardi 
 
LF 
 
There is no tax collector 
Ranisarai 
 
LF 
 
AKD X 
(85) 
-- -- -- -- X 
(20) 
X 
(36) 
Belda-2 
 
LF 
 
BM X 
(40) 
X X X 
(80) 
X 
(20 ) 
X X 
SO X 
(35) 
X X X 
(80) 
X 
(20) 
X X 
Kamarpukur 
 
LF BB X 
(20) 
X X X X X X 
(80)## 
AK X 
(60) 
X X X 
(75) 
X 
(25) 
X 
(20) 
X 
(80)## 
Source: Data collected from the field study  
@ Rich consists of both middle class and rich villagers 
Note: Figures in brackets denote numerical expression (%) of the respective opinion as perceived by the tax collectors; 
LBT= Land and Building Tax 
## During the last two financial years, total collection from LBT increased significantly which earlier used to be a 
meager amount 
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Appendix: 6.2 
 
Box 6.2.1 
A short summary of the nature of optional fees/rates/tolls listed in the standard circular provided by 
the PNR&D12  
 
Vehicle registration fee: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (1) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
yearly fees on the registration of motorized and non-motorized vehicles under its jurisdiction. 
Motorized vehicle refers to tractor with trailer which is carrying products other than agricultural 
products and proposed to be taxed at the rate of Rs. 250 yearly. And non-motorized vehicle refers 
to bicycle (used for business purpose), hand drawn cart, bullock cart, carriage drawn by buffalo or 
horse and van rickshaw and the wheels of those are covered with rubber tyre are proposed to be 
taxed at Rs. 12 and without rubber tyre are proposed to be taxed at Rs. 24 yearly.  
Rates for providing drinking water:   
 Under the section of 47 (1) (4) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
yearly rates for providing drinking water and which is proposed to be taxed at 30% of the total 
yearly valuation13 of land and buildings of the tax payers.  
Rates for providing street lights: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (5) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
yearly rates for providing street lights in its respective jurisdiction at the rate of 20% of the land 
and building tax  
Rates for waste clearance:   
 Under the section of 47 (1) (6) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
rates for cleaning, sanitary arrangement and public waste. For cleaning sanitary arrangement, GPs 
are supposed to charge Rs. 250 for each time. And for waste clearance GPs are supposed to charge 
Rs. 2 and 50 Paise per cubic feet 
Trade registration fee: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (7) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
annual trade registration fees for running business in its jurisdiction. For small business which are 
not under the tax net of  profession tax are supposed to be charged Rs. 50 and big businesses 
which pay profession tax and invested capital ranging from Rs. 25, 000 to Rs. 10 Lakhs are 
supposed to be charged in the range from Rs. 100 to Rs. 500 
Toll tax: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (8) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
levy tolls on roads or bridges maintained by them on both motorized and non-motorized vehicles. 
Motorized vehicles refer to four to eight wheelers and are proposed to be taxed in the range of Rs. 
5 to Rs. 25 per trip depending on the types of vehicles when loaded with passengers or goods and 
when unloaded Rs. 2 per trip. Non-motorized vehicles refer to hand drawn cart, bullock cart, van 
rickshaw motor cycle and scooter and are proposed to be taxed at Rs. 1 per trip. Non-motorized 
vehicles like carriage drawn by buffalo or horse are proposed to be taxed at Rs. 2 when loaded and 
when un-loaded at Rs. 1 per trip.  
Fees for drainage clearance:  
 Under the section of 47 (1) (12) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
fees on maintaining and cleaning drainage system under its jurisdiction at the rate of  Rs. 30 yearly 
                                                 
12The circular was republished in Panchayati Raj, Paschimbanga Sarkarer Traimasik Mukhapotro, Panchayat and Rural 
Development Department, Government of West Bengal, No. 1 (40), July-September, 2003, pp. 23-34. Although slightly different 
version is provided by The West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 2004,  Government of West Bengal, 
Department of Panchayats and Rural Development, November 23, 2004, pp-37-38  
13
 Total yearly valuation of land and building refers to 6% of the total valuation of land and building which is valued at the 
current market rate 
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for  per benefited family 
Crematorium maintenance fee: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (14) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
fees for arranging and maintaining places for cremation at the rate of  Rs. 50 per corpse 
Pump set registration fee: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (15) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
fees on motorized pump sets either run by diesel or electricity of different capacities which are 
rented out for making profit by cultivators after their needs are met. Pump set registration fee is 
proposed to be charged in the range of Rs. 150 to Rs. 500 per year depending on the capacities of 
the pump set.   
Market fee: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (16) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
fees on regulated market maintained by them used for selling agriculture production at the rate not 
more than Rs. 100 per product on daily basis and not more than Rs. 1 daily for per retail seller 
who do not pay profession tax  
Advertisement fee: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (17) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
fees on any advertisement which will be displayed in public places maintained by GPs at the flat 
rate of Rs. 250 yearly  
Fees on precious pets: 
 Under the section of 47 (1) (10) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, GPs are entitled to impose 
fees on precious pets of villagers at Rs. 10 per year 
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Table: 6.13 Reasons for attending and not attending Gram Sansad (GSN) and Gram Sabha (GS)  
 
Name of the 
GPs 
 
 
GPs ruled 
by 
 
 
Reasons for not attending Gram Sansad (GSN)  and Gram Sabha 
(GS) 
Reasons for attending 
GSN and GS 
Total 
Opinion of 
common villagers   
is not heard of at 
GSN & GS 
(%) 
Development 
schemes are 
usually 
implemented 
regardless of 
decision 
taken at GSN 
& GS  
 (%) 
Decision of  
GSN & GS 
are taken 
elsewhere 
which are 
conveyed to 
the villagers 
at GSN & 
GS (%) 
Importance 
of attending 
GSN & GS is 
not felt of  
(%) 
 
Persua- 
ded by 
the 
elected 
GP 
member 
(%) 
Because the 
necessity of 
attending 
GSN &GS is 
felt of 
 
(%) 
 
 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Srirampur  Non-LF 31.0 (31) 12.0 (12) 14.0 (14) 37.0 (37) 3.0 (3) 3.0 (3) 100 (100) 
Bogula-2 Non-LF 25.7 (26) 18.8 (19) 13.9 (14) 37.6 (38) 2.9 (3) 1.0 (1) 100 (101) 
Budhakhali Non-LF 32.7 (35) 8.4    (9) 18.7 (20) 25.3 (27) 6.5 (7) 8.4 (9) 100 (107) 
Narayanpur Non-LF 37.9 (39) 27.2 (28) 9.7 (10) 16.5 (17) 5.8 (6) 2.9 (3) 100 (103) 
Labhpur-2 Non-LF 18.6 (19) 28.4 (29) 13.7(14) 25.6 (26) 5.8 (6) 7.8 (8) 100 (102) 
Duilla Non-LF 40.4 (42)  19.2 (20) 12.5 (13) 21.2 (22) 2.0  (2)  5.0 (5) 100 (104) 
Subtotal for 
non-LF 
 31.1 (192) 19.0 (117) 13.8 (85) 27.0 (167) 4.4 (27)  4.7 (29) 100 (617) 
Kamarpukur  LF 12.6 (14)  12.6 (14) 15.3 (17) 51.3 (57)  8.1 (5) 3.6 (4) 100 (111) 
Shibdaspur LF 43.7 (44) 15.8 (16) 14.8 (15) 21.8 (22) 3.9 (4) 0 (0) 100 (101) 
Mamudpur LF 48.1 (52) 6.48  (7) 24.1 (26) 10.2 (11) 11.1 (6) 5.5 (6) 100 (108) 
Belda-2 LF 56.6 (64) 17.7 (20) 9.7 (11) 9.7 (11) 6.3  (3) 3.5 (4) 100 (113) 
Ranisarai LF 43.0 (43) 6.0    (6) 43.0 (43) 5.0 (5) 3.0 (2) 1.0 (1) 100 (100) 
Murardi LF 41.2 (42) 20.6 (21) 18.7 (19) 17.6 (18) 1.9 (2) 0 (0) 100 (102) 
Subtotal for 
LF 
 40.8 (259) 13.2 (84) 20.6 (131) 19.5 (124) 3.5 (22) 2.4 (15) 100 (635) 
Total  36.0 (451) 16.1 (201) 17.3 (216) 23.2 (291) 3.9 (49) 3.5 (44) 100.0 
(1252) 
Source: Data collected from the field study 
Note: Figures in brackets from column  2 to 7 denote number of villagers provided opinion in respect to the 
query and figures in bracket in column 8 denote total number of villagers interviewed 
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Table: 6. 14 Awareness of villagers about utilization of development funds and tax proceeds  
 
Name of  
the 
GPs 
GP s 
ruled by 
 
Knowledge of villagers as regards how funds allotted for developmental schemes 
and proceeds from taxes are utilized by the respective GP 
(%) 
Total 
Total misuse Skeptic about that Do not know Proceeds from taxes 
and development 
funds are being 
expended properly 
for the development 
of the GP  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Srirampur Non-LF 18.0 (18) 33.0 (33) 38.0 (38) 11.0 (11) 100.0 (100) 
Bogula-2 Non-LF 22.8 (23) 35.6 (36) 31.2 (32) 9.9 (10) 100.0 (101) 
Duilla Non-LF 23.0 (24) 43.3 (45) 24.0 (25) 9.7 (10) 100.0 (104) 
Labhpur-2 Non-LF 24.5 (25) 33.3 (34) 32.4 (33) 9.8 (10) 100.0 (102) 
Budhakhali Non-LF 42.0 (45) 37.4 (40) 14.1 (15) 6.5 (7) 100.0 (107) 
Narayanpur Non-LF 34.9 (36) 45.7 (47) 14.6 (15) 4.8 (5) 100.0 (103) 
Subtotal of Non-
LF 
 27.7 (171) 38.1 (235) 25.6 (158) 8.6 (53) 100.0 (617) 
Kamarpukur  LF 1.8 (2) 17.1 (19) 68.4 (76) 12.6 (14) 100.0 (111) 
Shibdaspur LF 35.5 (36) 32.7 (33) 17.8 (18) 13.9 (14) 100.0 (101) 
Mamudpur LF 26.9 (29) 56.5 (61) 12.0 (13) 4.62 (5) 100.0 (108) 
Belda-2 LF 48.7 (55) 18.6 (21) 23.9 (27) 8.8 (10) 100.0 (113) 
Ranisarai LF 61 .0 (61) 31.0 (31) 5.0 (5) 3.0 (3) 100.0 (100) 
Murardi LF 52.0 (53) 34.3 (35) 8.8 (9) 4.9 (5) 100.0 (102) 
Subtotal of LF  37.2 (236) 31.5 (200) 23.3 (148) 8.0 (51) 100.0 (635) 
Total  32.5  (407) 34.7 (435) 24.4 (306) 8.4 (104) 100.0 (1252) 
Source: Data collected from the field study 
Note: Figures in brackets in column  3 to 6 denote number of villagers provided opinion in respect to 
the query and figures in column 7 denote total number of villagers interviewed in the respective GP 
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Table: 6.15 Occupation - wise distribution of villagers in respective GPs 
 
Name of 
 the GPs 
GPs 
ruled 
by 
 
Profession of the villagers interviewed  
Other 
small 
business 
Culti- 
vator 
Land 
-less 
labor 
Retail 
shop 
owner 
Casu-
al 
labor 
Teach
-er 
House- 
wife 
Van 
puller 
Servic
e 
holder 
others Une 
mploy
ed 
Total 
Srirampur Non-
LF 
23 9 14 16 18 -- 2 6 1 3 8 100 
Duilla Non-
LF 
30 - - 12 8 10 7 3 7 5 22 104 
Labhpur-2 Non-
LF 
12 10 30 5 15 7 9 2 5 4 3 102 
Bogula-2 Non-
LF 
23 3 -- 9 25 -- 13 8 2 8 10 101 
Narayanpur Non-
LF 
19 14 22 13 16 5 - 5 -- 9 -- 103 
Budhakhali Non-
LF 
10 13 31 5 10 3 11 8 5 7 4 107 
Mamudpur LF 13 8 27 11 27 -- 9 3 3 3 4 108 
Ranisarai LF 19 12 25 3 21 1 11 2 -- 4 2 100 
Shibdaspur LF 15 6 29 9 10 -- 11 10 -- 1 10 101 
Kamarpukur LF 6 17 17 14 18 3 18 3 3 8 4 111 
Murardi LF 10 4 35 19 5 2 11 7 2 4 3 102 
Belda-2 LF 33 10 20 23 10 2 5 5 2 -- 3 113 
Total  213 
(17.0) 
106 
(8.5) 
250 
(20.0) 
139 
(11.1) 
183 
(14.6) 
33 
(2.6) 
107 
(8.5) 
62 
(5.0) 
30 
(2.4) 
56 
(4.5) 
73 
(5.8)  
1252 
(100.0) 
Source: Data collected from the field study 
 
Table: 6.16 Occupation-wise distribution of GP members  
 
Occupation/ 
Name of the GPs 
(total no. of GP 
members) 
GPs 
ruled by  
 
Agricu
-ltural 
labor 
Cultiva
-tor 
Servic
-es 
Teac- 
her 
House- 
wife 
Busin- 
ess 
Unemp- 
loyed 
Casual 
labor 
Othe-
rs@ 
Total  
Srirampur (24) Non-LF 1 1 1 4 6 10 -- -- 1 24 
Bogula-2 (25) Non-LF -- 4 1 2 11 7 -- -- -- 25 
Duilla (19) Non-LF -- -- 1 2 5 7 1 -- 3 19 
Budhakhali  (19) Non-LF -- 7 -- -- 8 2 1 -- 1 19 
Narayanpur (17) Non-LF -- 4 1 2 5 3 1 -- 1 17 
Labhpur-2 (11) Non-LF -- 5 -- -- 4 1 -- -- 1 11 
Subtotal for Non-
LF(%) 
 1 
(0.9) 
21 
(18.3) 
4 
(3.5) 
10 
(8.7) 
39 
(33.9) 
30 
(26.0) 
3 
(2.6) 
-- 7 
(6.1) 
115 
(100) 
Kamarpukur (21) LF -- 3 1 3 3 2 1 1 7 21 
Shibdaspur (10) LF -- 1 -- 1 2 5 -- -- 1 10 
Mamudpur (22) LF -- 2 -- 1 8 9 -- -- 2 22 
Belda-2 (16) LF -- 1 1 1 4 4 2 -- 3 16 
Ranisarai (13) LF -- 7 1 3 1 -- -- -- 1 13 
Murardi (10) LF 1 3 1 -- 1 2 -- 2 -- 10 
Subtotal for LF 
(%) 
 1 
(1.1) 
17 
(18.5) 
4 
(4.3) 
9 
(9.8) 
19 
(20.6) 
22 
(23.9) 
3 
(3.3) 
3 
(3.3) 
14 
(15.2) 
92 
(100) 
Total (207)  2 
(1.0) 
38 
(18.3) 
8 
(3.8) 
19 
(9.2) 
58 
(28.0) 
52 
(25.2) 
6 
(2.9) 
3 
(1.4) 
21 
(10.2) 
207 
(100) 
Source: Data collected from the field study 
@ Professions belong to „Others‟ category consists of private tutor, cook at primary school, priest , village level 
doctor, retired service person, government registered marriage officer, animal husbandry, Life Insurance 
Corporation (LIC) agent, Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) worker, professional political party worker 
and Anganwari workers. 
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Table: 6.17 Attending GSN and GS 
 
Name of GPs Total members  
Interviewed 
GPs 
ruled 
by 
Villagers do not want to 
attend GSN and GS 
Attendance in GSN and GS is 
spontaneous 
Total LF Non-
LF 
Total LF Non-LF 
Total LF Non-
LF 
Kamarpukur  20 20 0 LF 8 8 0 12 12 0 
Belda-2 14 11 3 LF 4 2 2 10 9 1 
Murardi  9 4 5 LF 1 0 1 5@ 4 1 
Ranisarai  13 13 0 LF 0 0 0 13 13 0 
Subtotal 56 
 
48 8 
 13 
(24.5)# 
10 3 40 
(75.5)# 
38 2 
Bogula-2 21 4 17 Non-LF 18 4 14 3 0 3 
Duilla 17 4 13 Non-LF 14 4 10 3 0 3 
Labhpur-2 10 5 5 Non-LF 7 2 5 3 3 0 
Srirampur 20 4 16 Non-LF 13 3 10 7 1 6 
Subtotal 68 
(100) 
17 51 
 52 
(76.5) 
13 39 16 
(23.5) 
4 12 
Total  124 65 59  65  
(53.7)* 
23 42 56 
 (46.2)* 
42 14 
Source: Data collected from the field study 
Note: Due to unavoidable circumstances we had to delimit ourselves to make survey on 8 GPs instead of 12 sample 
GPs 
@ In Murardi GP out of 4 non-LF GP members interviewed, one member said that no Gram Sabha (GS) and Gram 
Sansad (GSN) take place in Murardi. Other two non-LF GP members said that most of the time GS and GSN are poorly 
publicized thus hardly any GSN and GS meeting take place in this GP. And even then, it is not allowed by the LF GP 
members to continue these meetings democratically when common villagers along with the opposition supporters want 
to highlight some contentious issues like irregularities and corruption takes place in the GP ruled by the LF. In addition, 
decision has already been made beforehand and it was just conveyed at the meetings. Thus, as perceived by the non-LF 
members, GSN and GS actually take place on paper not in reality.  
# As percent to 53 total GP members excluding three non-GP members located in Murardi GP 
* As percent to 121 total GP members excluding three non-GP members located in Murardi GP 
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Table: 6.18 Distribution of development funds 
  
Name of  
the GPs 
GP members belong to 
the LF and non-LF 
 
 
GPs 
rule
-d 
by 
Distribution of development funds among 
constituencies headed by the GP members is very 
much influenced by the factors like GP members 
belong to the political party in power and/or their 
influence in the GP 
Development fund is distributed; 
 
 
Yes No on the basis of priority 
set by the GP through 
participatory planning 
process 
among all GP 
members equitably in 
order to ease the 
tension of capturing 
major portion of 
allotted funds by the 
few influential GP 
members in their 
respective 
constituencies  
   
LF Non
-LF 
Total LF Non- 
LF 
Total 
 
LF Non-
LF 
Total LF Non
-LF 
Total 
LF Non
-LF 
Tota
l 
Kamarpukur  20 0 20 LF 2 0 2 18 0 18 18 0 18 2 0 2 
Murardi  4 5 9 LF 0 4 4 4 1 5 2 0 2 5 2 7 $ 
Ranisarai  13 0 13 LF 1 0 1 12 0 12 1 0 1 12 0 12 
Belda-2 11 3 14 LF 1 3 4 10 0 10 2 0 2 9 3 12 
Subtotal 48 8 56 
(100) 
 
 
4 
(8.3)* 
7 
(87.
5)* 
11 
(19.6) 
 
44 1 45 
(80.4) 
23 0 23 
(41.1) 
28 5 33 
(58.9) 
Duilla 4 13 17 Non
-LF 
2 4 6 1 10 11 1 0 1 3 13 16 
Labhpur-2 5 5 10 Non
-LF 
3 0 3 2 5 7 1 5 6 4 0 4 
Bogula-2 4 17 21 Non
-LF 
3 8 11 1 9 10 4 15 19 0 2 2 
Srirampur 4 16 20 Non
-LF 
4 1 5 0 15 15 0 16 16 4 0 4 $$ 
Subtotal  17 51 68 
(100) 
 
12 
(70.5)
& 
13 
(25.
5)& 
25 
(36.8) 
4 39 43 
(63.2) 
6 36 42 
(61.8) 
11 15 26 
(38.2) 
Total 
(%) 
65 59 124  16 
 
20 36 
(29.0) 
48 40 88 
(71.0) 
29 36 65 
(52.4) 
39 20 59 
(47.6) 
Source: Data collected from the field study 
Note: Due to unavoidable circumstances, we had to delimit ourselves to conduct this survey on 8 GPs instead of 12 
sample GPs 
$ In Murardi GP, out of 4 non-LF GP members interviewed, 3 said that in principle distribution of funds are made not 
on the basis of priority areas set by the GP members rather it is distributed among GP members equitably in order to 
avoid quarrels and squabbles in capturing major portion of allotted funds by few. But in actuality constituencies 
occupied by the non-LF GP members get discriminated against. Furthermore, the decision as regards distribution of 
funds made actually at CPI (M) party office and the party virtually controls daily functions of the GP and the 
oppositions are not allowed to contribute their opinion on any matter. The final decision as regards how development 
funds thus allotted to the GP will  be distributed among the constituencies is just conveyed to the opposition.  
$$ In Srirampur GP, all 4 opposition LF GP members interviewed said that in principle distribution of funds are made 
not on the basis of priority rather it is distributed among GP members. But in actuality constituencies occupied by the 
LF members receive relatively less funds than that of constituencies occupied by the non-LF.    
* Percent to total LF (48) and non-LF GP members (8) in the group of LF led GPs separately 
& Percent to total LF (17) and non-LF GP members (51) in the group of non-LF led GPs separately 
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Table: 6.19 Attendance of villagers at Gram Sansad (GSN) and Gram Sabha (GS) - All GPS in WB 
 
 
 
Year 
(November of 
each year) 
Average attendance in 
each GSN meeting  
(%)  
Year 
(December of each year) 
 
Average attendance in each 
meeting  
(%) 
1999 13.0 1999 5.5 
2000 13.0 2000 5.0 
2001 11.0 2001 NA 
2002 12.0 2002 5.0 
2003 11.7 2003 7.0 
 
Source: Annual Administrative Report, 2003-04, Panchayat & Rural Development Department,  
Government of West Bengal, pp. 13-14.   
 
